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Abstract 
 
Advances in communication technologies such as instant messaging and 
video conferencing has given birth to virtual teams consisting of 
members who are geographically and culturally separated, and are 
working towards a shared goal. Extant literature has focused on trust 
development in computer mediated communication settings. In this 
research, we investigate whether broken down trust can be repaired in 
mediated settings. Specifically, we investigate the effects of culture and 
the type of computer media on trust reparation following trust 
breakdown.  Twenty students each from China and US played a trust 
game designed to simulate a trust breakdown. Ten participants in each 
cultural group were randomly assigned to either the instant messaging 
media condition or the audio-video media condition. Results showed 
that Chinese participants recovered slightly better from a trust 
breakdown initially than US participants, while trust recovery was not 
significantly different under the two media conditions. However, results 
were better for US participants in audio-video media condition as 
compared to instant-messaging condition.  Findings from this research 
refute previously established notion that cultural differences 
significantly influence behavior patterns and also raise doubts about the 
impact of media richness when communicating over computer media. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Advances in communication technologies such as instant messaging or video 
conferencing has given birth to virtual teams consisting of members who are 
geographically separated, and are working towards a shared goal.  Use of virtual 
teams allows organizations to recruit the best talent from around the world without 
incurring significant relocation, travel or administrative costs (Steinfeld, Chyung-
Yang, & Pfaff, 1999).  Offshore outsourcing of software projects is a good example 
of the use of virtual teams.  For instance, only 60% of Intel’s workforce is based in 
the US while 40% is spread all across the globe (Guzman, 2003). Also, recent 
terrorist events have prompted use of virtual teams.  For e.g., Oracle and Ernst and 
Young have doubled their global use of videoconferencing (Philadelphia, 2002).   
 
What are some of the challenges faced by virtual team members? Dube and Pare 
(2001) conducted in-depth interviews with 18 global virtual team leaders and 
members from different industries such as telecommunication, banking, etc and 
found out that the two key challenges facing virtual teams are technology and 
people themselves.  Technology issues such as accessibility and reliability hinder 
communication and coordination between the team members while cultural and 
organizational differences can be grouped under people-problems.  When group 
members do not co-exist physically, they depend on mediated interactions for 
coordination and communication and inevitably face the shortcomings of mediated 
communication such as lack of social presence, delayed responses, slow graphical 
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refresh rates etc.  Secondly, the likelihood of virtual team members coming from 
different parts of world, with different backgrounds, histories and cultures is very 
high (Loughran, 2000). As a result, conflict situations resulting from lack of 
understanding of cultural differences on part of the parties involved may arise. 
 
Both technology and people problems can affect the extent to which team members 
trust each other as we shall see in the ensuing chapter.  To deliver a project 
successfully or to achieve a goal, members in a virtual team need to be able to trust 
each other.  Nobel award winning economist Arrow (1974) considers trust as an 
essential component of a social system.  To be able to work efficiently and 
effectively, team members or business partners need to trust each other.  Fukuyama 
(1995) defines trust as “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, 
honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of 
the other members of that community.  For example, we trust our auto mechanic 
not to deliberately damage our car when performing a scheduled oil change.  Also, 
trust forms the basis for cooperation.  Economic activities that require people to 
depend on others’ future action for payoffs are achieved at lower costs in high-trust 
environments (Knack & Keefer, 1997).  
 
Outside of economics, trust has been shown to play an important role in online 
communities of practice.  For example, Preece (1999) identifies trust as a building 
block that unifies members especially in the realm of knowledge sharing and 
learning in online environments because members’ identities are hidden. Without 
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trust, the level of social engagement may be hampered and interactions between 
individuals, community, and societal realities form the basis of learning (Waters 
and Gasson, 2006).  
 
People who do not trust others will only cooperate under a system of formal rules, 
legal agreements, or contracts, all of which entail “transaction costs” or overheads 
(Fukuyama, 1995).  Trust between individuals is necessary for continuance of 
harmonious relationships (Lewis & Weigert, 1985).  Also, trust and reputation 
form the foundation of mediated transactions (Bolton, Katok, & Ockenfels, 2004; 
Resnick, Zeckhauser, Friedman, & Kuwabara, 2000). 
 
Mediated communication has its own challenges.  Hinds (1999), for example, 
showed that team members in virtual teams do not have a shared understanding of 
their task and are less cohesive.  Also, individuals are hesitant to trust offsite 
colleagues as much as they trust local ones (Handy, 1995; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 
1999).  Trust in an organizational setting, has been shown to be based on several 
factors including shared experiences and social norms (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; 
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995) both of which may be lacking when people 
communicate with each other from remote locations.  For example, onsite 
coworkers may strike impromptu conversations related to work in break-rooms and 
share their experiences about a project they are currently involved in.  Virtual team 
members do not get the benefit of such impromptu conversations which could 
potentially contribute towards progress of a project they are involved with.  
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Globally distributed team members have differential access to communication 
media (e.g., audio, video etc).   
 
Cultural differences may also dictate how trust develops in virtual team members.  
Hofstede’s (1980) individualism-collectivism dimension highlights the importance 
of cultural differences.  Members from individualistic cultures place importance on 
individual needs while members from collectivist cultures place interest of the 
group ahead of their individual goals.  As a result, there could be differences in 
how people from different cultures establish trust or reconcile after their trust is 
violated when they come together to accomplish a mutually beneficial task.   
 
While cross-cultural research has continued to receive attention over the years, 
there are 4 limitations we would like to address through this research. Firstly, there 
is a lack of empirical research assessing the impact of cultural background on how 
people reconcile following a breakdown in trust.  Ting-Toomey (2005) identifies 
trust breakdown and betrayal as concepts lacking research as indicated in the 
following excerpt: 
 
“The emotions of pride, shame, guilt, redemption, trust, betrayal, and 
disconfirmation, are all powerful emotional concepts lacking sufficient 
treatment in the intercultural literature”.   
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The second limitation comes from increased use of mediated communication. Do 
the degrees of social presence afforded by various computer media influence the 
extent to which people recover from a trust breakdown situation? This question has 
been addressed to some extent in previous research (Zheng et al, 2002) but under a 
trust development situation, not under a trust breakdown situation. Thirdly, to the 
best of our knowledge no research has been carried out to investigate whether there 
is any culture-media interaction effect on the trust recovery process. Lastly, many 
studies (e.g., Ting-Toomey, Gao, Trubisky, Yang, Kim, Lin, and Nishida, 1991) 
have been carried out to investigate conflict management styles across different 
cultures in face-to-face   (FtF) conversations. Typically, in these studies, 
participants are presented with a hypothetical conflict situation and they are then 
expected to complete a questionnaire asking them about their way of handling the 
conflict. We believe that such methods are indirect because participants are not 
directly involved in the conflict.  A more direct way of involving participants in a 
conflict situation is by having them play trust games where they are directly 
involved in a conflict situation.  Trust games have been widely used in the past 
(e.g., Riegelsberger, Sasse, McCarthy, 2003). However, trust games have not been 
used before to research effects of media and culture on trust breakdown and 
recovery.  Hence, our research is first in this respect as well.  
 
Developing an understanding of how people from different cultures reconcile 
following trust breakdown under different media conditions is crucial for effective 
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managements of conflict situations. Results from our study may shed some light on 
this aspect and we may even prescribe strategies for trust repair. 
 
In the past, several studies have been conducted to investigate how trust develops 
in virtual settings (Azevedo, Drost, & Mullen, 2002; Iacono & Weisband, 1997, 
Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999, Rocco, 1998, & Zheng, Veinott, Bos, Olson & Olson, 
2002).  What happens when there is a trust breakdown situation? Do people 
recover from such a situation? If they do, how quickly do they recover? Are there 
any cultural differences in how people reconcile? These questions are important 
more so in mediated settings because the members involved as the media may 
undermine their ability to provide explanations or clear out any differences (we 
will discuss some shortfalls of mediated communication in the following sections).   
To the best of our knowledge we know of no such study that investigates how 
people from different cultural backgrounds reconcile in a mediated communication 
setting. To summarize, the following are the key objectives of this research: 
1. Fill the gap in the literature on how people reconcile following a breakdown in 
mediated settings; 
2. Investigate if culture influences how people reconcile following trust 
breakdown; 
3. Investigate if media affects how people reconcile following trust breakdown; 
4. Identify and make recommendations for use of appropriate media (e.g., instant 
messaging, video-conferencing) for communication following trust 
breakdown; 
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We shall discuss the above four issues at length and arrive at our research 
hypotheses in the Literature Review chapter.  We employ trust games to simulate 
trust breakdown and recovery.  To evaluate the impact of media and cultural 
differences on how people reconcile, we have participants from two different 
cultural backgrounds play a trust game under instant-messaging (IM) and audio-
visual (AV) media conditions.  We describe our experiment setup in detail in the 
Methodology chapter.  The findings are discussed in the Results chapter. In the 
Discussion chapter we put our findings in the context of past research.  We discuss 
implications of our findings in the Conclusion chapter. 
  
8
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Defining Trust 
 
Trust has several different meanings.  According to Gambetta (2000), “when we 
say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the 
probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not 
detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of 
cooperation with him” 
 
There are several definitions of trust.  Psychologists (Rotter, 1967) have studied 
trust as well, while sociologists have studied the role of trust in building 
communities (Goffman, 1971).  We use the word trust to mean interpersonal trust 
in a business context, and more specifically in the context of Internet.  The word 
“interpersonal” implies that a judgment requires mutual assessment of a situation 
by two or more people (Davenport and McLaughlin, 2004).  In particular, we are 
interested in a form of interpersonal trust that develops in a short time span, called 
as “Swift Trust” (Mayerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996), because it represents several 
real-life collaborations by virtual team members on one-time short-lived projects.  
 
Williamson (1993) characterize trust as : 1) placing trust in the trustee puts the 
trustor at risk, (2) relative to the set of possible actions, the trustee’s decision 
benefits the trustor at a cost to the trustee; and (3) both trustor and trustee are made 
  
9
better off from the transaction compared to the outcome which would have 
occurred if the trustor had not entrusted the trustee. 
 
This type of trust develops over several encounters. Per Dasgupta (2000), “For trust 
to be developed between individuals they must have repeated encounters, and they 
must have some memory of previous encounters… trust is linked with reputation, 
and reputation has to be acquired.” 
 
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998) define trust as a “psychological state 
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of 
the intentions or behavior of another”. The trust game, discussed here, follows this 
definition of trust where in the proposer sends money to the responder hoping that 
the responder will be fair and share any windfall. In doing so, the proposer is 
accepting to be vulnerable as it quite possible for the responder to not share any 
profits with the proposer. 
 
Very recently, Gillespie & Dietz (2009) proposed a framework for understanding 
employees’ perception of organization’s trustworthiness. Although findings from 
our research can be extrapolated to an organizational context, we limit the scope of 
our research to trust repair between two individuals and not organizations. 
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Trust breakdown and recovery 
 
Trust is fragile. It is created slowly, but it can be destroyed in an instant by a single 
mishap or mistake (Slovic, 1993).  Trust breaks down when the information 
received does not conform to one’s expectations from the other (Lewicki and 
Wiethoff, 2000).  For example, Schweitzer, Hershey and Bradlow (2006) used a 
prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) to demonstrate trust breakdown.  In a two person 
PDG they used a set of pre-programmed non-cooperative moves.  In response 
participant trust levels, measured by payoffs, dropped significantly. 
 
In some cases persons responsible for trust violation may want to reconcile and 
manage their image (as perceived by the victims) by trying to avoid blame and 
social disapproval with the objective of collaborating in the future.  Tedeschi and 
Reiss (1981) define the process in which any behavior by a person with the 
objective of controlling or manipulating the impressions formed of oneself by 
others as impression management.  This concept is related to the trust reparation 
process. Trust reparation occurs in two stages (Lewicki and Wiethoff, 2000).  First, 
the parties involved attempt to exchange information about perceived violation.  
Miscommunications and misunderstandings are cleared. Following a transgression, 
people may use several methods to clarify misunderstandings and manage their 
impression.  These include confession, apology, excuse and denial (Weiner, 
Graham, Peter and Zmuidinas, 1991).   In the second stage they reaffirm their 
commitment to trust each other.  Commitment and execution of cooperative moves 
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in the future has been shown to repair broken down trust (Schweitzer, Hershey and 
Bradlow, 2006). 
 
Offering an apology can be the simplest form of impression management. Ohbuchi, 
Kameda and Agarie (1989) studied the impact of an apology on the victim’s 
aggression.  In this study 58 female undergraduate students participated in a figure 
identification task.  A set of preprogrammed errors, such as presenting the figures 
upside down, changing the figures too quickly etc, were made by the experimenter 
resulting in poor performance by the participants on the identification task.  
Participants were then evaluated based on their performance.  Participants in one 
condition were then offered an apology for the wrong doing.  Participants 
perception of the wrongdoer was measured using rating scales.  Participants in the 
apology condition rated the wrongdoer as being more sincere , more responsible 
and more careful when the wrong doer had apologized than when no apology was 
offered.  Darby and Schlenker (1982) also showed that apologies are effective in 
reducing negative consequences in the future and also lead to forgiveness. 
 
Expressing remorse for wrongdoing has also been shown to be associated with 
forgiveness.  For example, Gold and Weiner (2000) conducted a study in which 
they asked 345 students to imagine a situation in which one of their friends has 
confessed to cheating in a very important class exam which in turn altered the 
grading curve and resulted in the study participant receiving a bad grade in that 
particular exam. Further, participants in one condition were asked to imagine that 
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this friend has admitted to feeling absolutely terrible about it and in another 
condition the friend has absolutely no remorse and feels fine about cheating on the 
exam.  Participants were then asked to provide their ratings on items such as 
stability, morality, sympathy, forgiveness, and anger.  Results of this study showed 
that remorse along with confession was highly effective and significantly better 
than mere confession on the scales of forgiveness and sympathy, and rated 
significantly lower on the anger scale (less angry). 
 
Breach of trust can also be viewed as a conflict situation. Ting-Toomey (1994) 
defines conflict as perceived and/or actual incompatibility of values, expectations, 
or outcomes between two or more parties. Further, Ting-Toomey’s (1988) theory 
of face-negotiation seems relevant in the context of how individuals from different 
cultural backgrounds adopt different conflict-management strategies based on their 
unique face-concerns. Face represents an individual’s claimed sense of positive 
image in the context of social interaction (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003). Ting-
Toomey’s (1988) face-negotiation theory argues that individuals in all cultures 
attempt to negotiate one’s face, especially in embarrassing or conflict situation 
where their identities are called into question. Individuals from different culture, 
however, react differently in these situations. For examples, individuals from 
cultures that attach more significance to collective well-being will be more 
concerned with other-oriented face-saving and not worried about saving one’s own 
face. This concept will be elaborated further in the subsequent sections. 
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Impression management and apology literature discussed above suggests that trust 
can be repaired to some extent if the wrongdoers show remorse and commit to 
future cooperation.  Research so far, however, has focused on FtF expression of 
apology and remorse.  Use of electronic media may have different implications in 
that it may influence the victim’s perception of the wrongdoer.  Exclusive research 
assessing the influence of different media conditions on trust repair and 
reconciliation needs to be researched to ascertain media suitability under these 
conditions. 
 
Lewicki and Bunker (1996) first developed a model for trust repair. But, a 
concerted effort to study trust repair was not undertaken recently.  For example, a 
recent issue of Academy of Management Review journal included a special topic 
forum on trust repair.  Topics included causal attribution (Tomlinson & Mayer, 
2009); contextual factors surrounding trust repair (Rhee and Valdez, 2009), effects 
of violation types and culture on trust repair (Ren and Gray, 2009) and trust repair 
after an organization-level failure (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009).  The above topics 
make propositions for how trust can be repaired but do not include empirical 
findings.  The empirical nature of our research makes it a natural extension of the 
above. 
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Communication media and its relevance to trust reparation 
 
Exchange of information in mediated communication setting may be accomplished 
using several different media: audio only, audio and video, or text messaging, each 
of which has a varying degree of media richness.  Computer mediated 
communication may exist in several forms such as email, instant messaging, 
bulletin board, online blogs or WIKIs. The scope of this research is limited to 
synchronous communication such as instant messaging, telephone, or web 
conferencing.  Media richness refers to the amount of richness that can be 
conveyed through the communication medium (Poole, Shannon, DeSanctis, 1992). 
FtF communication remains the gold standard in terms of richness (Daft, Lengel & 
Trevino, 1987).  Features of different communication media are depicted in Table 
1.  Features of different communication media and discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
Table 1.  Features of different communication media 
 
 Aural
Cues 
 
Visual 
Cues 
 
Nonverbal 
Cues (e.g., 
body 
language) 
 
FTF 
 
X X X 
Video and Audio 
 
X X (partial) X (partial) 
 
Audio (Telephonic)
 
X   
Instant messaging 
 
None None None 
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The visual channel provides eye-gaze cues, facial expressions, postures and 
gestures.  For example, in a two person conversation, the face becomes the most 
important part of our body and the one that is most attended to.  Also, our speech is 
often complemented by facial movements such as raising of eye-brows and 
upwards movement of head when asking a question.  Eye-gaze is another important 
part of the facial expression.  The most basic use of eye gaze is instantiated in a 
group conversation.  In this situation, we gaze in the direction of a particular person 
we want to address among other people in the group. Ellsworth and Carlsmith 
(1968) researched the effects of eye contact and verbal content of a conversation on 
the affective responses of participants.  The experimenters interviewed 43 
undergraduate student participants using two verbal contents (positive and 
negative) and two eye-contact conditions (yes and no) in a factorial design.  In the 
positive verbal content condition, frequent eye-contact was shown to produce more 
positive evaluations of the experimenter by the participants.  In the negative verbal 
content condition, frequent eye-contact produced more negative evaluations.  Study 
results from this research has direct implications for trust reconciliation research 
under different media conditions. 
 
Short, Williams and Christie (1976) identify two aspects of a professional 
conversation, namely: interparty and interpersonal. Interparty communication 
arises from role playing by the members involved while interpersonal conversation 
arises from the need to maintain personal and affective relationships.  For example, 
curious managers asking their employees about the reason for absence from work, 
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on the previous day, may have work related (interparty) concerns as well as 
concerns about their employees’ well being (interpersonal).  These aspects of 
communication were further distinguished by Morley and Stephenson (1969 and 
1970) in their study assessing the effects of different media in a simulated 
industrial wage dispute resolution task. Students played roles of either the 
management or the union representative and communicated either by phone or 
face-to-face.  Results showed that students were more successful in arriving at a 
settlement when communicating over the telephone than in the face-to-face 
communication condition.  Results from Morley and Stephenson’s (1969 and 1970) 
imply that the medium of communication affects the balance between the interparty 
and interpersonal aspect of conversation such that communication over the phone is 
more task oriented. 
 
 
Trust Development in Virtual Environments 
Current day communication technologies allow people to work together even when 
they are not collocated.  Past research (Azevedo, Drost, & Mullen, 2002; Iacono & 
Weisband, 1997, Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999) has shown that trust development can 
be fostered in virtual environments. 
 
Jarvenpaa & Leidner (1999) tasked teams of 4-6 participants with developing a 
world wide web site to be used by an information systems community called IS 
World Net.  Participants on each team were dispersed globally and were expected 
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to collaborate on the project.  Teams were expected to complete the project in 4 
weeks.  The only means of communication was email.  Trust between team 
members was measured using two separate rating scales. Social communication 
exchanges between team members were shown to promote trust between team 
members.  Social communication entailed discussion of hobbies, their weekend 
activities, and their families at length.  Later on in the project, frequent and 
predictable communication was associated with higher levels of trust.  
 
Rocco (1998) conducted a two stage study to assess the impact of pre-task FtF 
meetings on trust development in a PDG.  Twelve teams of six participants each 
participated in the study.  In the first stage, six teams communicated face-to-face 
and three teams communicated via non-anonymous emails to complete the PDG.  
In the second stage, participants met FTF for 45 minutes in socialization activity 
before participating in the PDG via non-anonymous emails on the following day.  
The results showed high levels of trust can be achieved via pre-task socialization as 
measured by the group payoffs as well as from the content analysis of the emails.  
Post-task questionnaire also showed that FTF treatment achieved some degree of 
socialization leading to group identity and eventually trust between the team 
members. 
 
Extending Rocco’s (1998) line of research, Zheng, Veinott, Bos, Olson & Olson 
(2002) used total payoffs in a PDG as a measure of trust.  Prior to the gaming task 
pairs of participants engaged in a social activity either via face-to-face 
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conversations, text messaging, posting of a picture, or posting of a personal 
information sheet.  Pairs in the control condition did not engage in pre-task 
interactions.  Pairs of participants in all the conditions completed thirty rounds of a 
day-trader game.  Participants were expected to contribute to either a common 
pool, whose pay off was based on how much one’s opponent invest, or keep it in an 
individual account.  The best option for each participant was to convince the 
opponent to contribute entirely to the common pool while investing one’s own 
amount to the individual account.  Optimum profits were obtained when both 
players invested entirely in the common pool. The face-to-face condition generated 
highest pay offs while the control condition (no prior interaction) produced the 
least payoffs.  However, the text messaging and picture condition were also 
effective in establishing trust. 
 
In the context of trust reconciliation, outcome from Zheng et al (2002) would 
predict better results for reestablishing trust when communication aimed at 
assuaging one’s opponent following trust violation (e.g., conveying feelings of 
remorse, commitment to cooperation in the future, etc) is made over telephonic 
(non-video) medium because individuals may pay close attention to the task at 
hand and what is being said.  
 
To better understand media choice, Short (1972) administered twenty-two 7-point 
rating scales to assess participants’ perception of one another following a dyadic 
negotiation task either using the phone, video or face-to-face.  Scales included 
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items such as trustworthy-untrustworthy, friendly-unfriendly, pleasant-unpleasant, 
reasonable-unreasonable etc. Participants in the audio condition rated more 
favorably than participants in the other two conditions.  Specifically, there was a 
significant effect of medium on the trust rating with participants in the audio 
condition rating their opponents as highly trustworthy suggesting that 
conversations that people might prefer the audio channel to communicate when the 
task involves confrontation or interpersonal tension. 
Rice (1993) used Short et al’s (1976) social presence theory to compare traditional 
with new organizational media.  Rice (1993) conducted a survey at six different 
sites of various sizes and structures. Respondents were asked to rate the 
appropriateness of different media for each of ten communication activities: 
exchanging information, negotiating or bargaining, getting to know someone, 
asking questions, staying in touch, exchanging time-sensitive information, 
generating ideas, resolving disagreements,  making decisions, and exchanging 
confidential information. Means ratings showed that respondents ranked face-to-
face as the most appropriate means of communication for all but two (staying in 
touch and exchanging time-sensitive information) of the above communication 
activities, followed by phone meeting, desktop video, voicemail, text, and email. 
Results of this study suggest that people consider the face-to-face medium as the 
gold standard when it comes to social presence.   
 
However, the trust reparation activity is different from other formal negotiations 
because it may involve negative feelings towards the violator which, in turn, may 
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cause people to seek more of interpersonal communication (e.g., explanations for 
violating trust, apologies, etc) rather than the formal interparty communication.  In 
addition, in a trust violation situation, people may not prefer to look at each other.  
For example, Exline, Thibaut, Brannon & Gumpert (1961) showed that participants 
accused of cheating in a group task showed reduced mutual visual interaction with 
the confederate.  Also, participants, often cite several embarrassing situations when 
asked about what type of tasks would suit telephonic conversations because of its 
depersonalized nature (Short, Williams and Christie, 1976).   
 
Further, communication media vary in the degree of social presence.  Short, 
Williams and Christie (1976) define social presence as the subjective quality of the 
medium.  Attributes of a medium such as capacity to transmit information about 
facial expressions, direction of looking, posture, attire and non-verbal vocal cues 
contribute towards the degree of social presence afforded by the medium.  
However, the weights for each of the above attributes are determined by the user.  
The degree of social presence is also related to two other social psychological 
concepts.  These are intimacy (Argyle and Dean, 1965) and technogical immediacy 
(Heilbronn and Libby, 1973).  Argyle and Dean (1965) propose that there are both 
approach and avoidance drives when people converse with each other.  The 
approach component is primed by the need to receive feedback and reinforcement 
from the addressee.  The avoidance component arises from the fear of being seen 
and the fear of revealing one’s inner states to the addressee.  Specifically, two 
people engaged in a face-to-face conversation will settle at a level of intimacy 
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based on factors such as eye-contact, physical proximity, and topic of discussion.  
For example, this theory predicts that people may want to avoid eye-contact and 
increase physical separation when affective topics are discussed.   
 
Another relevant concept in regards to communication is immediacy. In the context 
of communication, immediacy is a measure of psychological distance put by a 
person between oneself and the addressee (Wiener and Mehrabian, 1968).  This 
theory posits that specific inferences about feelings and attitudes can be drawn 
from a speaker’s use of particular words. For example, use of words such as “We”, 
“Us” etc suggest closeness and association while words such as “I”, “ You”, etc 
suggest separation.  Technological immediacy is a related concept.  It predicts 
immediacy of communication based on choice of medium used (Heilbronn and 
Libby, 1973). For example, use of asynchronous medium, such as an email, for 
communicating may hint at non-immediate nature of the content of 
communication.  In addition, people may prefer using a more synchronous medium 
of communication based on their closeness to the addressee.  For example, a spouse 
my want to break the news of a baby being born by using a telephone to call his 
close friends and family rather than by email.  On the other hand, distant relatives 
or coworkers may be notified via email.   
Based on the discussion above, following factors may influence choice of media in 
the context of trust violation: 
1. The victim’s perception of closeness or disassociation with the violator; 
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2. Victim’s expectations of how an apology should be made (eagerness to see 
one’s opponent or complete avoidance); 
3. Victim’s perception of the task as a merely mechanical or that involving 
emotions and affection; 
4. Victim’s perception of immediacy, 
5. Victim’s perception of the degree of social presence required by the trust 
reparation process and that afforded by the medium. 
 
In tasks involving high degree of confrontation or interpersonal tension, 
conversations over audio links might be preferred to those encountered over the 
more intimate media such as video or face-to-face.  Since the audio medium is 
rated low on social presence, discussions over this medium are more task oriented 
and less person-oriented than face-to-face discussions.  For example, unequivocal 
tasks can be accomplished over lean media while equivocal tasks require rich 
media. 
 
In short, there are pros and cons of different communication media.  Electronic 
medium has one big advantage in that they overcome time and space boundaries.  
This has caused pervasive diffusion of computerized media in organizations.  
Continuous usage has prompted users of computer media to overcome some of the 
limitation imposed by these media.  For example, Park (2007) recently researched 
the use of an instant messenger by student chat group involved solving 
mathematical problems.  The group participants typically comprise of 3-5 
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elementary and middle school students and a moderator.  Analysis of chat logs 
from these problem-solving sessions showed that the students overcame the 
limitation of communication medium by using various linguistic and paralinguistic 
tools such as prosodic features, capital features, and emoticons to represent gesture 
and facial expressions.  The results of this study suggest that people compensate 
effectively for shortcomings of computer media such as not being able to transmit 
voice intonations, pauses, gestures etc.  The video channel has now being tapped 
into to convey non-verbal cues but remains far from being equivalent to a FTF 
conversation. 
 
Previous studies (Bos, Olson, Gergle, Olson & Wright, 2002; Rocco, 1998; Zheng, 
Veinott, Bos, Olson & Olson, 2002; McEvily, Wilson & Straus, 2006) have 
investigated the effect of different media channels on trust development.  However, 
none of the studies have researched the effects of communication media on 
recovering from a trust breakdown situation. Media suitability for the trust 
reparation process needs to be researched to better understand what media features 
are important to people whose trust has been violated. 
 
After a breakdown in trust if people are allowed to communicate their intent and 
clear misunderstandings with their opponents, it is anticipated that the media 
richness (or media) will affect the trust recovery process.  The media richness 
theory (Daft & Lengel, 1984) posits that communication media differ in the extent 
to which they can (a) overcome constraints of time, location, permanence, 
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distribution, and distance; (b) transmit the social, symbolic, and non-verbal cues of 
communication; and (c) convey equivocal information. The communication cues 
available are dependent on the richness of the media.  Richer communication media 
makes it easier for the people involved to interpret the communication (Daft & 
Lengel, 1984).  Also, rich media allows people to develop personal relationships 
and improve communication clarity (Purdy, Nye & Balakrishnan, 2000) facilitating 
mutual interests.  Poorer communication channels result in a sense of anonymity.  
However, as discussed above, people may consider a trust violation situation as 
embarrassing and that involving affect and hence prefer poorer and more task-
oriented media for reconciliation.  The confrontational nature of the trust reparation 
process is another reason why people would prefer less richer media as predicted 
by Short et al (1976).  Based on this argument, the following is hypothesized. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  
Individuals are likely to achieve a higher degree of reconciliation following an 
untrustworthy behavior when they receive clarifications from their opponents over 
a less rich media as compared to individuals communicated to over a richer media. 
 
Cultural Differences and Trusting Behavior 
Culture is to society what is memory is to self (Triandis, 1989).  Culture forms the 
basis for guidelines and ways to think about self and social behavior.  Typically, 
these guidelines are the ones that have been proved to be effective in the past.  
Individuals may use the guidelines when confronted with social situations.  Some 
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guidelines are universal while other not.  Distinct patterns of social behavior are 
synonymous with cultural differences.   
 
Ting-Toomey (2005) defines culture as a learned system of meaning that fosters a 
particular sense of shared identity and community among its group members.  The 
significance of culture in researching trust violation and reconciliation arises from a 
basic fact: culture shapes behavior (Wheeler, Reis & Bond, 1989).  Hofstede 
(1980) proposed two broad dimensions for defining cultural differences: 
collectivism and individualism.  People in the collectivist culture prioritize group 
welfare over the welfare of the self.  Individuals are interdependent and develop 
strong and deep rooted ties with others.  Individualistic societies tend to be 
independent in thought and action.  The focus is more on the goals and 
accomplishment of the self rather than the group.  Apart from subordinating their 
individual goals with those of the group, collectivists also tend to be concerned 
about the result of their actions on members of their group (Triandis, 1989).  In 
individualistic societies individuals attempt to act in a way that is different from 
others. Being distinct is valued. In collectivist cultures, conforming to established 
social norms is a common practice.  For example, Eby and Dobbins (1997) studied 
33 groups (a total of 148 participants) who were involved in a complex 
interdependent task of developing a marketing plans, schedules, raw material 
purchase, and sales strategies.  Results showed that teams with members having a 
collectivist orientation exhibited high degree of cooperation which in turn affected 
their overall performance. 
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Triandis (1972) makes a distinction between subjective culture and material 
culture.  Material cultural refers to visible or outwardly elements of a society such 
as food, way of dressing onself, roads, tools, highways etc. While, subjective 
culture refers to the psychological aspect of living. For example, values, norms, 
social etiquettes etc.  Collectivist cultures tend to emphasize this subjective part 
more so than individualistic cultures. In collectivist cultures, people are expected to 
behave in a certain way and any deviation from the norms is frowned upon. In 
individualistic societies, deviation from a norm is expected and encouraged.  
 
The question of how these norms come into being and why a certain culture 
embraces a norm is a much larger discussion beyond the scope of this research.  
Here, it is important for us to know how culture shapes behavior at the 
psychological level. Although we are interested in studying cultural differences, 
our unit of analysis is an individual who ultimately forms the basis for a particular 
culture. In particular, we are interested in investigating if culture shapes behavior 
of individuals following a conflict situation.   
 
Note that the terms individualism and collectivism are used in the context of 
organizational behavior.  The scope of the research is limited to how people from 
different cultures reconcile following breach of trust.  Some collectivist societies 
such as India, stress the importance of being responsible for one’s own action 
which may be interpreted as a sign of individualistic society.  However, when it 
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comes to organizational behavior Indians may be aligned closely with their 
surrounding people and may be more inclined to conform to established norms 
displaying collectivist behavior. 
 
Strong reciprocators or people who believe strongly in cooperation tend to punish 
group members who act selfishly. For example, in Fehr and Gachter (2002), 75 
percent of punishing acts in a study with 240 participants were initiated by above-
average contributors.  Does culture have a bearing on how people perceive fairness 
and what they consider as just punhisment? 
 
Berman, Murphy-Berman and Singh (1985) studied differences in how university 
students from India and U.S perceive fairness.  In their study, Berman et al asked 
university students from India and U.S. to imagine a situation in which a bonus was 
to be distributed between an excellent worker who is economically secure and a 
moderate worker who is in great financial need.  Students could either choose to 
allocate the entire 100% of bonus on the basis of equity or give away the entire 
amount to the person in need.  A third strategy of distributing the bonus equally 
between the two workers was also available.  Results showed that, among the 
American participants, 49% opted for the equity option, 16% opted for distributing 
the bonus on need basis, and 34% said they would distribute the bonus equally 
between the two.  Amongst the Indians, 51 percent indicated that they would 
distribute the bonus on need basis and only 16% said they would consider equity as 
an option.  Equality was opted for by 32% of the participants.   
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The differences in how people perceive fairness is related to their most important 
relationships (Moghaddam, Taylor, and Wright, 1993).  The most important 
relationships for the Indians are those of family and community.  For Indians, 
interdependency is considered positive and necessary.  This explains why Indians 
chose need as a basis for distributing the bonus in Berman et al (1985).  For 
Americans, relationships are more individualistic in nature and dependence on 
others is not a positive trait.  Equity based distribution, hence, is more common 
among Americans.  In a trust violation situation, Indians, for example, may be 
more forgiving as compared to Americans because they may stress the importance 
of long-term relationships and may be more willing to work towards a common 
solution.  Gelfand, Nishii, Holcombe, Dyer, Ohbuchi, K., & Fukumo, M. (2001) 
also showed that there are differences in how people from different cultural 
backgrounds perceive conflict.  Gelfand et al (2001) found that identical conflict 
episodes are construed differently by American and Japanese students. 
 
Differences in behavior have been shown to be a result of differences in child 
rearing practices.  Child rearing practices in individualistic societies tend to 
emphasize self-reliance, independence, autonomy, creativity and self reliance; 
while those in collectivist societies emphasize conformance to norms, obedience, 
and collective thinking (Triandis, 1989). 
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Why do child rearing practices significantly different in individualistic and 
collectivist societies? Barry, Child and Bacon (1951) take an anthropological view 
of this question and relate differences in child rearing practices to the nature of 
subsistence economies.  Specifically, Barry et al (1951) theorize that economies 
which depend on food accumulation (e.g., agricultural) tend to stress collectiveness 
in thinking such as conformance to established practices, obedience to elders and 
the wise, and faithful performance of established routine tasks.  This is important 
because carelessness or individual thinking in regards to storage of food can lead to 
threats of hunger for all.  On the other hand, subsistence through hunting or fishing 
does not afford extended storage or accumulation.  In these economies, 
individualistic thinking and innovation is nurtured greatly because individuals are 
solely responsible for their actions in terms of rewards or punishment.  Depending 
on others for food is highly discouraged as it may lead to starvation. 
 
Antecedents of collectivism include resource scarcity, and earning a livelihood 
through activities that require collective efforts such as agriculture.  This is true of 
most eastern cultures.  This explains why people in the eastern hemisphere of the 
globe tend to be more collectivist.  Antecedents of individualism include affluence, 
social mobility, geographic mobility and earning a livelihood through activities that 
require individual pursuits (Triandis, 1995).  These are synonymous of most 
western cultures hence the individualistic nature of these societies. Individualism 
and collectivism is also tied to the homogeneity of the culture.  More homogeneous 
the members of a particular society more likely it is that they will share the same 
  
30
norms, culture, beliefs, attitudes, roles and values.  Thus homogeneity leads to a 
collectivist behavior because uniqueness is not valued (Triandis, 1995).  The same 
relation exists between a society of heterogeneous members and individualistic 
behavior.  
 
When it comes to cultural research it is safe to consider country as the equivalent of 
a culture (Triandis, 1995).  Hofstede (1991) showed the distribution of several 
countries along the individualism collectivism continuum.  The U.S., U.K., 
Australia, Denmark, Sweden, and New Zealand are rated as individualistic 
societies on this continuum. Countries including India, Singapore, China, 
Indonesia, and several east African nations are rated as collectivist in nature. 
Trust violation, the desire to get even, and the role of remorse are part of human 
social behavior.  In the discussion above we have seen how culture affects social 
behavior.  
 
Very recently Gevorgyan & Manucharova (2009) showed that cultural background 
does influence online expectations, preferences, experiences.  Gevorgyan & 
Manucharova (2009) asked 200 American (Individualists) and 170 Chinese 
(Collectivists) participants to list 10 websites that they thought were attractive in 
terms of design and layout. American participants reported 700 unique websites 
while Chinese reported 442 unique websites. Analysis of the website showed that 
Chinese participants chose websites that had collectivist features such as family 
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themes, chat rooms, blogs, chat rooms etc, while American participants chose 
websites that reflected individualistic values.  
 
Individualism and collectivism are closely related to concepts of low-context and 
high-context cultures (Hall, 1976). In high-context cultures, the onus of attaching a 
meaning to the communication is on the receiver. The content of communication is 
situated in the context and is internalized. For example, in a case of conflict, 
individuals from high-context culture may avoid confrontation through increased 
vagueness in their communication. Conversely, individuals from low-context 
culture believe in explicit communication and prefer to confront openly in case of a 
conflict situation.  
 
In a conflict situation, such as breach of trust, the parties involved may be 
concerned with the following (Ting-Toomey, 1988: (a) self-face; concern for own’s 
image (b) other-face; concern for another’s image. Cultural background influences 
which one of the above an individual may be more concerned with. For example, 
Ting-Toomey et al (1991) compared face concerns of student from the U.S. 
(individualistic) with those of students from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
(Collectivists). Results from this study showed that, with the exception of the 
Japanese, all students from collectivist countries showed more concern for other’s-
face. Whereas, students from the U.S showed more concern for self-face. To 
summarize, independence is associated with self-face whereas interdependence is 
associated with other-face. 
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Face concern may influence the conflict style. Oetzel & Ting-Toomey (2003) 
conducted a survey to establish a relationship between cultural orientation 
(individualist/collectivist), face concerns and conflict styles.  For this study, 768 
student participants were drawn from two collectivist countries, China and Japan, 
and two countries with individualistic orientation, Germany and U.S. All 
participants completed a self-construal questionnaire and a face-concern 
questionnaire.  The dependent variable, conflict style, was operationalized using 23 
items to measure participants’ choice of avoiding, integrating and dominating 
conflict styles. Results of this study showed that independence, preferred in 
individualistic societies, is positively associated with self-face, where as 
interdependence is associated positively with other-face.  Further, the results also 
showed that self-face is associated with dominating conflict styles, whereas other-
face is associated positively with avoiding and integrating conflict styles. 
 
Ting-Toomey, Gao, Trubisky, Yang, Kim, Lin and Nishida (1991) hypothesize that 
cultural variability affects individuals’ face-maintenance dimensions, and these 
face maintenance dimensions, in turn, affect conflict management strategies or 
styles employed by individuals when faced with a conflict situation where “Face”, 
as defined by Ting-Toomey (1988), represents the projected and claimed sense of 
self-image and self respect in relational situations.  
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In their cross-cultural research study Ting-Toomey et al (1991) use Rahim’s (1991) 
categorization of 5 different conflict styles, namely: integrating, obliging, 
dominating, avoiding, and compromising.   Participants in this study were 
university students from the U.S., Japan, China, South Korea, and Taiwan. Results 
from this study showed that there is a significant effect of culture on face-
maintenance. Participants from the three collectivist cultures (China, S. Korea, and 
Taiwan) showed a greater degree of other-face concern as compared to participants 
from individualistic cultures. Secondly, the Chinese and Taiwanese (collectivists) 
adopted a more obliging and avoiding conflict styles as compared to U.S. 
participants when faced with a conflict situation. The results from this study 
suggest that individuals from collectivist societies will act in manner that is 
beneficial to all and avoid confrontation. Although we are interested in 
reconciliation following trust breakdown, and not conflict situations, we see a 
similarity between the two. For example, participants in Ting-Toomey et al (1991) 
were given a hypothetical situation in which a class project member from the 
group, of which the participant is a part, doesn’t complete the assigned work, 
because of which the group’s grade for that class is jeopardized. This situation is 
different from a situation where two people develop trust over set of pre-defined 
trials of a trust game involving monetary gains and then a trust breakdown situation 
is conjured. However, we would like to believe that this situation is also requires 
participants to adopt a particular type of conflict management strategy and that 
cultural differences would dictate which strategy an individual would adopt. 
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Closely related to the concept of Face is politeness theory advocated by Brown and 
Levinson (1987). Polite behavior is defined as the use of verbal and non-verbal 
strategies that pay due respect to hearer’s face needs where face consists of two 
basic desires: the desire not to be imposed upon (negative face concerns) and the 
need to be appreciated and approved (positive face concerns). The universality of 
this theory has been challenged, however.  For example, Park (2006) challenge’s 
Brown and Levinson’s (1987) politeness assessment formula as it does not take 
into account the social context and settings into consideration. This is important, 
more so, when we apply the formula in different cultural settings because what is a 
norm in one society may not have any value in other. Overlooking the social 
context, hence, results in incorrect weights being applied to a face-threatening act. 
 
Ting-toomey (1999) argues that identities of individuals in every community are 
shaped by their interaction with other group members. Polite behavior is one where 
individuals adhere to the norms and scripts’ that are commonly accepted as 
appropriate for a given context by most members of the community. Note that rules 
or norms, valid within a community, may not be valued in other communities or 
nationalities. For example, addressing a person older to you by his or her first name 
and without any salutation is considered as a rude behavior in India, whereas it is a 
common practice to address coworkers or colleagues by their first name in the U.S. 
In a recent study, Hatipoğlu (2007) attempted to establish a relation between 
national identities and the way professional conference organizing committees 
from two different cultures, British and Turkish, begin their communication when 
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sending out Call for Papers (CfP) via emails.  In particular, Hatipoğlu (2007) 
researched whether writers from these two nationalities (dis)obey some of the 
politeness rules (e.g., use of salutations) theorized by Brown and Levinson (1987). 
Results showed that 95.4% of CfP by British writers did not include salutations 
while 43.6% of CfP by Turkish writers included some form of salutations such as 
colleagues, friends, and members; units that Brown and Levinson (1987) describe 
as basic mechanism for expressing politeness. British writers, in this case, appeared 
to avoid drawing attention to their interrelationships’ with their peers or readers 
and may not have meant to be impolite as defined by Brown and Levinson (1987). 
This study indicates that politeness is perceived differently across cultures and also 
affects the way in which individuals communicate. 
 
Also, note that Hofstede’s (1991) national cultures model rates the British culture 
as individualistic and the Turkish culture as collectivist. In Hatipoğlu’s (2007) 
research, the Turkish writers were found to perceive communication as a 
mechanism for establishing social relationships as explained by their frequent use 
of salutations in the CfP written by them.  Whereas, the British writers perceived 
communication as merely a device for exchanging information. 
 
Park (2008) uses linguistic politeness theory as an explanatory mechanism for face 
enhancing strategies adopted by people in certain situations.  Linguistic politeness 
refers to linguistic politeness tactics used by people in interpersonal 
communication as a mechanism for managing and enhancing their public self-
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image or face.  A very recent application of linguistic politeness theory for 
evaluating communication features employed by users of computer media can be 
seen in Park (2008).  In this study, Park (2008) analyzed online discussions of 
groups of students in grades 6-11 trying to collectively solve a math problem 
online.  Roughly 3-5 students constituted each group and each group was expected 
to solve a math problem online through exchange of ideas and thoughts via a 
synchronous text based communication channel. Analysis of these textual 
transcripts showed that participant use several politeness strategies such as smiley 
faces when communicating with an adult moderator unlike the use of a more direct 
speech when communicating with their peers. Also, in this study, participants 
seemed to avoid disagreement with their peers’ problem solving strategy by first 
agreeing to what was said and then switching one’s stance to disagreement as is 
evidenced by the following statement made by a student while communicating with 
his/her peer (Park, 2008): 
 “I know you got the right answer, but your way is kinda wrong…” 
Such examples show the use of politeness strategies employed by students in 
online environments.  Influence of cultural backgrounds on how such statements 
may be framed is open for research.  
 
Results from DeLuca, Gasson & Kock (2006) also showed that people develop 
compensatory mechanism to overcome limitations (e.g., increased ambiguity) 
posed by less rich medium of communication. Four virtual teams successfully 
completed business process improvement tasks using an electronic bulletin board 
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in conjunction with e-mail. Ninety-five percent of the participants reported making 
adaptation to overcome perceived limitations of electronic communication medium 
over face-to-face. Use of emoticons (e.g., smiley faces) was one such adaptation. 
Some adaptations were even considered improvements over face-to-face 
communication.  Further, all teams successfully completed their projects. 
 
To summarize, online environments do support the use of politeness strategies and 
people may use them to manage their face. Our research, however, is more geared 
towards objective measurement of trust repair following trust development and 
breakdown.  We do use a mediated environment for facilitating communication 
amongst our study participants. But, the communication, very often, is restricted to 
sending and receiving of monetary offers between the participant and a 
confederate. Although we do not discourage general conversations between the 
participant and confederate, the experimental setup, as we shall see in the 
subsequent section, does not provide an opportunity for the participants to deviate 
from the task at hand, which is to focus on the monetary offers.  Hence, we are not 
in a position to perform a qualitative analysis of the chat transcripts as described in 
Park (2008).  Instead, we base our inference on statistical analysis of the monetary 
offers made by the participants in our study. 
 
The theories outlined above suggest that task oriented people from individualistic 
cultures may believe in equity and retaliation for wrong done to them.  On the other 
hand, individuals from collectivist societies may aim at developing long term 
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relationships and pay close attention to the explanations and apologies for wrong-
doings.  In other words, individuals from collectivist cultures may be more 
forgiving and willing to overlook trust violations as compared to individuals from 
individualistic cultures.  Based on this argument, the following is hypothesized. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals from collectivist cultures are more likely to achieve 
higher degree of reconciliation following an untrustworthy behavior when they 
receive a clarification from their partners as compared to individuals from 
individualistic cultures. 
 
Per Hofstede (1980), the U.S. has a high individualism score of 91 whereas the 
score for China is 17, leaning more towards collectivism.  The two being major 
economies, for our research we decided to select U.S. and Chinese students to 
represent individualistic and collectivistic cultures respectively. 
 
Social distance has been shown to affect trustworthiness (e.g. Buchan and Croson, 
2004). Buchan and Croson (2004) investigated interaction of trust and 
trusworthiness between two individuals at increasing levels of social distance (e.g., 
parent and children, siblings, cousins, stranger from home town, or stranger from 
another country).  They compared trust and trustworthiness in two societies: 
Chinese and U.S.  Participants were university students from China and U.S. A 
total of 94 students participated in this study. Both, proposers and responders were 
queried at the beginning of the game as to how much money they would send and 
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how much they would expect to receive. The amount sent by the proposers and 
responders were standardized on a scale of 1-10. Results from these study show 
that amounts sent by Chinese proposers were higher than those sent by U.S. 
proposers.  Interstingly, amounts sent by proposers declined with increasing social 
distance (i.e., parent > sibiling > student you know well > sudent from another 
university > stranger from home town > stranger from another country) in both 
countries.  Also, the proportion responders would return was higher for Chinese 
participants than U.S.  However, participants from China as well as U.S. showed 
persistent sensitivity to social distance with participants reporting more trusting and 
trustworthy behavior with opponents who were closer to them social distance (e.g., 
parents). The results from this study suggest that Chinese are more trusting and 
trustworthy as compared to the U.S. Also, people may be more trusting of others 
when the social distance is minimal.  For our research, we are more interested in 
trust between individuals who are complete strangers to each other with one 
exception: the pairs in our trust game have the same nationality (i.e., either Chinese 
or Americans). Another difference between the study conducted by Buchan and 
Croson (2004) and our study is that we have our participants play multiple rounds 
of the trust game.  Repeated encounters allow people to adjust and readjust their 
strategy and have the potential of reflecting their true levels of trust. Secondly, we 
are more interested in trust breakdown and repair in a 2-person trust game and 
hence face the need to provide, the parties involved, with several opportunities to 
develop trust.  This is not possible in a one-shot, one-round trust game. 
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Players in our game were told that they would play approximately 30 rounds of the 
trust game. The exact number of repetitions was not specified because the trustees 
could use this information to behave strategically by not returning anything to 
trustor in the last few rounds as they have no incentive to reciprocate.  This 
situation was observed in Cochard, Van, and Willinger (2004). In 7 round trust 
game, Cochard et al observed that participants playing the role of responders were 
more trusting of proposers in the first 5 rounds as evidenced by the higher amounts 
sent by the responders for the initial 5 rounds.  For the last two rounds, responders 
sent back very little. Cochard et al provide a possible explanation for this behavior. 
Responders may think that they have been reciprocal enough in the first few rounds 
that they can now act selfishly.  Cochard et al call this phenomena “erosion of 
reciprocity”. For our study, we would like to keep this erosion to a minimum as we 
are interested in knowing whether broken trust can be repaired and if yes, to what 
extent. By not telling participants about the number of rounds we wanted to 
constrain participants’ strategic behavior which may arise if they know when the 
game is going to end. 
 
Cultural Differences and Computer Media 
Having discussed cultural differences and media richness in isolation the next 
logical question that comes to light is whether people from different cultures agree 
on the use of a particular medium in a situation where uncertainty needs to be 
reduced by communicating with other parties involved. For example, in a situation 
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where communication with a peer is necessary, do Chinese prefer to communicate 
FTF while the Americans, in the same situation, would use the telephone? 
 
Rice (1998) researched this question through a survey of managers from Australia, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and the U.S.  According to Hall and Hall (1990) Australian 
and American societies are considered to be low-context and individualistic while 
societies in Hong Kong and Singapore are considered to be high-context and 
collectivistic.  Of the five communication channels, namely, FTF, a business 
memo, electronic email, voice mail, and telephone, mangers were asked to rate 
their preference of media as first, second and third.  For 9 of the 11 equivocal 
situations requiring communication, collectivists preferred FTF interaction more 
than did individualists.  Individualists preferred both FTF interaction and the 
business memo less as compared to collectivists.  These results suggest that people 
from collectivist cultures prefer richer media for communication. 
 
In a recent study, Xie, Rau, Tseng & Su & Zhao (2009) showed that collectivists 
are better at comprehending implicit and non-verbal cues, while individualists are 
better at handling explicit information 
 
Guo, Tan, Turner & Xu (2008) compared Chinese and Australian students’ 
preferences for media. Specifically, they compared IM with email and telephone by 
providing their participants with six hypothetical communication activities 
requiring students to communicate with their peers and lecturers and asking them 
  
42
to rate their preference for each medium of communication. Chinese students 
showed preference for IM and telephone while Australian students preferred the 
asynchronous communication medium of email.  
 
Breach of trust may involve slightly different dynamics.  In this case, people may 
want to save their face and avoid any embarrassing situation.  Specifically, research 
conducted by Ting-Toomey et al (1991) showed that collectivists are more 
concerned with other-face while individualists are concerned with self-face.  
Further, we know that individualists prefer more direct low-context communication 
as opposed to collectivists who prefer more indirect and high-context 
communication (Hall, 1976).  All of the above factors suggest that in a trust breach 
situation collectivist may prefer more richer media to communicate any differences 
as compared to individualist who would prefer more direct less richer media.  The 
following hypothesis will be tested as part of this study. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Following breach of trust, collectivists will prefer to communicate 
their differences over a richer medium (e.g., audiovisual chat).  Individualists, on 
the other hand, will prefer to communicate their differences over less richer 
medium such as text messaging. 
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Measuring trust in mediated communications 
 
Lewicki & Wiethoff (2000) identify two distinct types of trust: professional and 
personal.  Professional type of trust is task oriented and is restricted to achievement 
of goals external to their relationships.  For example, a buyer-seller relationship in 
which both parties agree to adhere to a code of business ethics entails professional 
trust.  Personal trust is based on socio-emotional relationship and its primary focus 
is the relationship itself.  For example, a husband and wife relationship could be 
based on personal trust.  The scope of this research, however, is restricted to 
professional trust.   
 
In the past, several studies (Rocco, 1998; Zheng, Veinott, Bos, Olson & Olson, 
2002; Schweitzer, Hershey and Bradlow, 2006; Bos, Olson, Gergle, Olson & 
Wright, 2002) have used cooperation in a PDG as a measure of professional trust, 
where the total payoff reflects the extent of cooperation.  In a two person PDG, 
optimum payoffs result when both parties cooperate fully. Individually, however, a 
party will benefit by not cooperating while convincing opponents to cooperate 
fully.  Hence, PDG are also called “mixed motives” games as the interest of the 
parties partially coincide and partially conflict.   
 
Although, Riegelsberger, Sasse, McCarthy (2003) argue that measuring trust via 
payoffs in PDG is problematic because the synchronous nature of these games 
model only specific situations and also fail to capture the complexity of trust 
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formation process.  According to Riegelseberger et al (2003), participants in a PDG 
are well aware of the risks associated with their decisions. In the-real world, 
however, people will perceive risks as threats because risks cannot be quantified.  
Further, people tend to rely on the trust mechanism when they cannot quantify all 
possible outcomes of their decisions (Fukuyama, 1995; Kee and Knox, 1970).  
Also, PDGs are synchronous in nature because all parties have to make a decision 
simultaneously.  Quite often real life situation are not synchronous in nature, but 
are sequential.  For example, two airline companies who have agreed to cooperate 
to better utilize the market share will not cooperate or defect at the same time.  An 
action by one will more likely be used as a trigger for retaliatory action by other.  
 
For this reason Riegelsberger et al (2003) suggest using trust games.  Trust games 
have been widely used in economics (Dastgupta, 1988; Berg, Dickhaut, and 
Mccabe, 1995; Bacharach, Gambetta, 2001).  The following description of trust 
game is adapted from Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). 
 
A trust game has two stages.  In the first stage participants A (Sender) and B 
(Receiver) receive $100 each.  While participant B pockets all of the $100, 
participant A decides how much of the $100 to send to B.  The experimenter then 
triples the amount sent by A before sending it to B.  Note that participant A may 
choose not to send anything to B.  In the second stage, participant B decides how 
much of the money to return to A.  Participants have used trust as a basis for their 
decisions if: (1) Placing trust in the receiver puts the sender at risk, (2) The 
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receiver’s decision benefits the sender at a cost to the sender and (3) both the 
sender and receiver are better off from the transaction relative to the outcome 
resulting from sender not trusting the receiver. 
 
The conditions of trust are satisfied as follows: (1) in the first stage, it is risky for 
the sender to send any money to the receiver because the receiver may or may not 
reciprocate; (2) in the second stage, the receiver has to give up some money to 
make the sender better off; and (3) tripling of money in the first stage ensure that 
both parties are better off trusting each other as compared to the no trust condition 
(sender sends $0). 
 
The asynchronous nature of trust games is more closely models real world 
situations.  The first stage models trust shown by the sender in the receiver.  
Whereas the second stage models how well the receiver honors trust shown by the 
sender.  For reasons discussed above, this research will use a variant of trust game 
to measure trust. 
 
Another version of trust game is Ultimatum Game, where the sender is offered $10 
and instructed to send anywhere from $1 to $10 to the receiver, under conditions of 
anonymity. The receiver can either keep the money offered or reject it. If the 
receiver rejects the offer, both players receive nothing, and upon acceptance, the 
two players share $10 accordingly. Several studies have used UGs in the past.  
Also, in many instances there is evidence that sender offers the receiver substantial 
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percentage of their amount (50% being the most frequent offer) and the 
respondents frequently reject offers that are less than 30% as seen in the studies 
conducted by Camerer & Thaler (1995), Guth & Tietz (1990), and Roth , Prasnikar, 
Okuno-Fujiwara, & Zamir (1991).   
 
In particular, Roth et al (1991) studied people from different nationalities to 
investigate if cultural differences have a bearing on how people behave in an 
ultimatum game.  They found that Israeli proposers sent lower offers, the most 
frequent being 40 percent as compared to a modal offer of 50 percent in case of 
subjects from US.  At the same time, Israeli responders were willing to accept 
lower offers.  One important point to note here is that the proposers and responders 
met only once to play the game and there was no scope for the individuals to 
develop a rapport for future cooperation. 
 
Overall, individuals display a strong sense of reciprocity. Responders reject offers 
from proposers that are less than 40 percent thereby punishing proposers’ non-
cooperative behavior. Are people motivated by reciprocity? Blount (1995) 
investigated this question.  Results from her study showed that respondents rarely 
reject low offers generated by a computer and when they are aware of this fact.   
 
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) used the ultimatum game to investigate if there is 
discrimination based on ethnic affiliation within Israeli Jewish society.  They 
studied two major ethnic group: European and American immigrants and their 
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Israeli born offsprings, and Asian and African immigrants and their Israeli born 
offsprings.  Students with typical ethnic names were selected for this study and 
were paired with students from a different university.  Students playing the role of 
a proposers were told that they were going to be paired with another student from a 
different university.  The proposers received name of the persons, with whom they 
were paired, on a sheet of paper.  Results from this experiment showed that 60 
percent of proposers sent the entire amount they received to the responders when 
the responders were European and American immigrants and their offspring, while 
only 20 percent of proposers transferred the entire amount they received when the 
responders they were paired with were Jews of Asian and African origin.  Results 
from this study show that trust games can be successfully used to extract people’s 
perception towards one another. 
 
In recent study Vasalou, Hopfensitz, & Pitt (2008) used the trust game to compare 
the effects of a reputation system, a reputation system with a built-in apology, and 
a reputation system with built-in apology combined with a forgiveness component , 
on trust repair following a trust breakdown. Twenty participants in each of these 
three conditions played a trust game with a confederate. The confederate 
reciprocated with a cooperative move on the first four rounds, defected in the fifth, 
and cooperated in the sixth round. Participants provided assigned a reputation score 
to the confederate directly after offense (round 5) and after the subsequent round 
(round 6).  Results showed that participants in apology and forgiveness condition 
assigned a significantly higher score to their confederate than those in the 
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reputation condition signaling effectiveness of apology and forgiveness in trust 
repair situation.   
 
In the trust game, we use the amount of money sent by the proposer as a measure 
of trust.  The proposer trusts the receiver with a certain amount.  Similarly, the 
amount sent back by the responder is considered as a measure of trustworthiness.  
More specifically, we associate increase in trustworthiness following trust 
breakdown with the extent to which trust has been repaired. Glaeser, Laibson, 
Scheinkman and Scoutter (2000) employed 2-person trust game in their study to 
investigate how well attitudinal measures of trust (survey questions) predict 
trusting and trustworthy behavior.  The game we use is very similar to Glaeser et al 
(2000) with minor differences. Glaeser et al (2000) allow participants to meet prior 
to the game. In our case, one of the participants is always a confederate with same 
nationality as the other participant (e.g., Chinese participant paired with Chinese 
confederate). Secondly, we are interested in investigating the influence of cultural 
background on trust breakdown and repair between individuals who haven’t had a 
chance to meet each other before the game.  To do this, it was important for us to 
restrict other factors that may affect the trust repair process.  One of the factors 
that, we believe, would influence the trust repair process is the social distance 
between the participants in the trust game. For our study, we chose participants 
with maximum social distance as a baseline. In other words, we ensured that 
participants have not met or know the confederate prior to the experiment.  Trust 
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repair under other levels of social distance is definitely research worthy but is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
  
50
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
Participants 
 
A total of 40 graduate students participated in our research study, twenty of which 
were born in China and were pursuing graduate studies in US universities.  The rest 
were US born graduate students pursuing graduate studies in the same universities 
as their Chinese counterparts.  Although the study was open to both male and 
female graduate students, all participants in our study were males.  Further, all US 
born participants in our study were Caucasian.  Table 2 depicts demographics of 
participants in our research. 
 
Table 2.  Participant demographics 
 
Nationality 
 
Mean 
Age 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Number of years in 
US (Chinese Students 
Only) 
 
US 
 
28.77 
 
10.53 
 
1.5 months 
 
China 
 
26.40 
 
5.19 
  
 
 
At the time of our study, Chinese participants had been in the US since a short time 
period of 1.5 months.   
 
Because English is not the first language for Chinese participants we asked them to 
rate themselves on their level of comfort with spoken and written English on a 6-
point rating scale, with a rating 6 representing a very high comfort level and a 
rating of 1 representing very low comfort level.  The average rating provided by 
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Chinese participants for written and spoken English were fairly high at 4.8 
(standard deviation = 1.1) and 4.45 (standard deviation = 0.88) respectively.   
 
In a recent paper, Ren and Gray (2009) identified different types of trust violation, 
namely: identity violations and violations of control.  Further, they propose trust 
restoration strategies that are appropriate for each type.  Per Ren and Gray (2009) a 
one-size-fits-all strategy for trust restoration may not be very effective when 
restoring trust following breakdown. In addition, language, emotion and facework 
(Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2002) rules need to be taken into account when dealing 
with trust violations in a cross-cultural context. In our study we were interested in 
studying the extent to which individualists and collectivists recover from a trust 
breakdown situation. Hence, we treat the two cultural groups as our independent 
(treatment) variable and keep the reconciliation strategy fixed. 
 
Data Collection Instrument and Equipment 
The experiment was conducted in a lab setting.  Participants completed a 
background questionnaire and a perception questionnaire (see appendix).  For the 
trust game, we provided participants with a laptop connected to the internet and 
equipped with instant messaging (IM) software for communication.  Participants in 
the audio-video (AV) condition of the experiment were also provided with a web 
camera and a telephone.   
 
Procedure 
 
All participants were first briefed on the informed consent and provided with 
details of the trust game.  After the participants signed the informed consent, they 
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were requested to complete a background questionnaire.  The background 
questionnaire is adapted from Triandis (1995) and helped us ascertain participants’ 
individualist or collectivist orientation.  The questionnaire has been validated in 
other studies (e.g., Lee & Choi, 2005; Chirkov, Lynch & Niwa, 2005). 
 
For the trust game, 10 male participants were randomly assigned to IM or AV 
condition.  Power analysis with two predictor variables (Culture and Media) and 
significance level at 0.05 yielded a power of 0.77, which, we believe, is sufficient 
for our analysis. 
In both conditions, participants were paired with a confederate.  Participants in the 
IM condition communicated with the confederate only via text messages and did 
not see the confederate.  However, for the AV condition, participants got the 
opportunity to briefly see the confederate over a web based camera. Participants 
and confederate played the trust game from two separate rooms. The assignment of 
participants in each media condition is shown in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3.  Participant allocation to the various media conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All US participants were Caucasians.  For the AV condition we ensured that the 
nationality of the confederate matches the nationality of the participant (e.g., 
 AV 
 
IM 
 
US 10 
 
10 
 
China 
 
10 
 
10 
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Chinese participants were paired with a Chinese confederate).  We also made sure 
that the participants had not met the confederate before the experiment.  These 
measures allowed us to curtail any participant bias arising from the fact that the 
confederate belongs to a different cultural background than that of participants.  
This is relevant for the AV condition of the experiment where a participant is 
expected to see the confederate over a digital medium.  For the IM communication 
channel, inter-cultural bias was not an issue because participants in this condition 
did not have an opportunity to see or listen to the confederate.  In the text condition 
all communication was conducted via the instant messaging software.  Experiment 
set-up for the two media conditions is depicted in Figure 1 and  
Figure 2. 
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Figure 1.  Experimental setup for IM condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Experimental setup for AV condition 
Offers sent/received via 
instant messenger 
Participant Confederate 
Room A Room B 
Web 
camera 
Web 
camera 
Offers sent/received via 
instant messenger 
Participant Confederate 
Room A Room B 
  
55
The experimental set up for AV condition was almost the same as that of the IM 
condition except for the inclusion of a web camera and a telephone. 
 
Participants completed 30 rounds of a trust game via instant messaging software.  
Participants were told that they would be interacting with another participant 
recruited for the study.  This way we could manipulate trust development and 
breach by having the confederate follow a pre-determined set of offers (e.g., send 
increasingly higher or lower offers).  Note that participants did not have 
information about the total number of rounds to be played.  Participants were told 
that their participation is expected for several rounds.  This was necessary to avoid 
any non-cooperative moves in the last few rounds (end game effect) because 
participants may not feel the need to cooperate given their knowledge of total 
number of rounds to be played. 
 
Participants in both IM and AV media conditions were provided access to instant 
messenger software that allowed for exchange of text messages.  For the trust 
game, participants were instructed that they would alternate between the roles of a 
sender and receiver every 10 rounds.  Participants were supposed to assume that 
they have received $40 per round for investment purposes and any money sent by 
the sender would be tripled before the receiver receives it.  The receiver then, 
decided to keep the entire amount or send back part of it back to the sender.  
Tripling of the amount sent by the sender provides an opportunity for the receiver 
to send some of it back and still make more money than the sender.  In so doing, 
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the receiver can motivate the sender to send more money in the next round and 
gradually build trust.  
 
Participants were told that they would make between $10 and $15 for participating 
in the experiment and based on the outcome of the trust game.  We believe that 
participants’ compensation when tied to the outcome of trust game would motivate 
them to play the game seriously. However, all participants received $15 for their 
participation. 
 
At the end of each round, the experimenter provided details about the amount sent, 
received, returned and payoffs for participant as well as the confederate.  For 
rounds 1-10 and 20-30, the confederate played the role of the sender and 
participant the receiver.  For trials 11-20, the confederate played the role of a 
receiver while the participant played the role of a sender.  In trials 1-10, the 
confederate was requested to send increasingly higher offers regardless of the 
amount returned by the receiver.  This way, we were able to create conditions 
conducive for trust development.  To manipulate trust violation in trials 11-20, the 
confederate, acting as a receiver, sent increasingly lower amounts back to the 
participant.  This facilitated trust violation, similar to that in Schweitzer et al 
(2006), after the participants had an opportunity to develop trust in the previous 10 
rounds (rounds 1-10).  The last 10 rounds (rounds 21-30) were reserved for trust 
reparation.  The confederate, now acting as the sender again, sent increasingly 
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higher offers to the participant in an attempt to build trust.  We measure trust repair 
by analyzing the amounts sent back by the participant (receiver) for rounds 21-30. 
 
In Bos et al (2002) and Zheng et al (2002), the payoffs seemed to level off around 
the 10th trial.  Based on this result, experimenter strategies are changed at the end 
of every 10 rounds.  Experimenter strategies over the 30 rounds are shown in Table 
4 
 
Table 4.  Confederate strategies over 30 rounds 
 
 
 Rounds 1-10 Rounds 11-
20 
Rounds 21-30 
Confederate 
strategies 
 
Cooperate 
 
Defect 
 
Cooperate 
 
 
 
Table 5 depicts the roles played by the confederate and participant.  The sender 
always initiates the game by sending a portion of the assigned $40 to the receiver. 
 
 
Table 5. Roles played by confederate and participant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rounds 1-
10 
 
Rounds 
11-20 
 
Rounds 
21-30 
 
Confederate 
 
Sender 
 
Receiver 
 
Sender 
Participant 
 
Receiver 
 
Sender 
 
Receiver 
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Table 6 lists the preset amounts sent by confederate as a sender and receiver. 
 
Table 6. Amount Sent by Confederate as a Sender and Receiver 
 
 
Round # Confederate Role Participant Role Amount Sent 
by 
Confederate 
($) 
1 Sender Receiver 4 
2 Sender Receiver 9 
3 Sender Receiver 13 
4 Sender Receiver 17 
5 Sender Receiver 22 
6 Sender Receiver 25 
7 Sender Receiver 32 
8 Sender Receiver 34 
9 Sender Receiver 38 
10 Sender Receiver 40 
11 Receiver Sender 10 
12 Receiver Sender 20 
13 Receiver Sender 25 
14 Receiver Sender 15 
15 Receiver Sender 0 
16 Receiver Sender 0 
17 Receiver Sender 5 
18 Receiver Sender 0 
19 Receiver Sender 2 
20 Receiver Sender 5 
21 Sender Receiver 20 
22 Sender Receiver 25 
23 Sender Receiver 28 
24 Sender Receiver 32 
25 Sender Receiver 34 
26 Sender Receiver 34 
27 Sender Receiver 36 
28 Sender Receiver 36 
29 Sender Receiver 38 
30 Sender Receiver 40 
 
 
Note that the amounts gradually increase for rounds 1-10 reaching the maximum 
possible $40 by round 10 followed by gradually reduced amounts for rounds 11-20.  
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Also, the amounts sent back by confederate for rounds 11-20, although low, are a 
bit erratic to ensure that the participants do not observe a trend and suspect 
manipulation by confederate. 
 
In both IM and AV media conditions, offers were sent and received by the 
participants and confederate through text messages sent via instant messenger.  
Participants were told that they should keep their communication to a minimum 
and only send in their offers via IM.  However, at the end of round 20, following 
trust break down, participants were requested to communicate their goals for the 
game to the confederate, discuss their perception about trust violation and clear any 
misunderstandings. The confederate was instructed to follow a script and provide 
an explanation for lower offers sent in the previous 10 rounds (i.e. rounds 11-20).  
At this point the confederate reflected back participants’ feelings. For example, the 
confederate would say “I understand how you may be feeling now”, and attempt to 
assuage participants’ remorse.  As an explanation, the confederate told the 
participants that the rules of the game were not clearly understood by him and now 
that the game was clear, he would commit to sending in higher offers in the 
following 10 rounds (i.e. rounds 21-30).  No time limit is set for this intervention 
activity. However, most often the intervention lasted for approximately 5 minutes. 
Tomlison, Lewicki, and Dineen (2002) suggest that, after a trust breakdown, 
relationships need to be reconciled before they the parties involved start rebuilding 
trust again. By allowing the parties involved to clarify any differences via instant 
messaging or audio-video chat we provide them with an opportunity to reconcile.   
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The confederate did not offer a direct apology to the participants. This was 
important because different cultures may perceive an apology in a different way 
and may attach different meaning to it. A direct apology, hence, would have 
introduced unwanted complexity. 
 
In IM condition, this dialog took place through text messages via IM, and in AV 
condition, the confederate provided this explanation over the phone and web 
camera.  Hence, participants in AV condition were able to see and hear the 
confederate when he provided an explanation for sending in lower offers for rounds 
11-20.  Participants in both media conditions went back to finish the remaining 10 
rounds of the trust game using the IM software after the explanation was provided. 
Note that the use of web camera and telephone in the AV condition was only meant 
for the confederate to provide an explanation following which, the use of web 
camera and telephone was discontinued.  
 
Table 7 shows the set up for the two media conditions. 
 
Table 7. Communication Medium for Confederate’s Intervention 
 
 
 Offers for 
Rounds 1-10 
sent over: 
Offers for 
Rounds 
11-20 sent 
over: 
Confederate 
provides 
explanation 
over: 
Offers for 
Rounds 
21-30 sent 
over: 
IM IM IM IM IM 
AV IM IM Telephone 
and Web 
Camera 
IM 
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Data Collection 
 
All participants completed a background questionnaire (see appendix) before 
playing the trust game.  The background questionnaire asked participants to rate 
and categorize their beliefs about day to day etiquettes and their preferences on 
different social matters.  Participant responses on these questions allowed us to 
gain insights into their individualistic or collectivist orientation.  Although Chinese 
and American cultures have be respectively classified as individualistic and 
collectivist in the past, we wanted to know whether participants’ perception of 
themselves differed among the two groups.  The background questionnaire allowed 
us to explore participants’ perception of themselves. 
 
All participants completed a perception questionnaire at the end of round 10, 20 
and 30.  The perception questionnaire was employed to record changes in 
participants’ perception about their opponent following trust development (i.e. 
rounds 1-10), trust violation (i.e. rounds 11-20), and trust recovery (i.e. rounds 21-
30). These questions asked participants about their perceptions of their opponent in 
terms of their trust, integrity, honesty, and reliability (1: Not at all, 6: Completely).  
For example, participants will rate questions such as “I perceive my opponent as 
trustworthy”.  Participant ratings will be used to further support any claims. 
 
Also, messages (offers) sent by participants via the instant messaging software 
were saved as log files.  These files also included the dialog between the 
confederate and participant after round 20 where the two try to clear away any 
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misunderstandings.  This dialog was captured for the IM condition only as the 
dialog for AV condition was telephonic. 
 
Amount returned by the participants for each trial will be used as a measure of 
trust. Several studies in the past (Bos, Olson, Gergle, Olson & Wright, 2002; 
Graham, 1985; Rocco, 1998; Zhang, Olson & Olson, 2004, Zheng, Veinott, Bos, 
Olson & Olson, 2002) have used total payoffs as a measure of trust.  These studies 
used PDG.  In case of trust games, however, the amount returned by participant 
reflects trust shown by the participant in the confederate.  Hence, the amount 
returned by participants was used as a measure of trust. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
The data gathered through this activity was subjected to descriptive as well as 
inferential statistical analysis.  We used standard descriptive statistics such as mean 
and standard deviation to describe the data.  Inferential statistics took the form of 
analysis of variance and regression analysis.   
 
Table 8 identifies the various tests performed on different sets of data collected 
during the study. 
 
Table 8.  Statistical tests for various dependent variables 
 
Data Statistical Analysis and 
Tests 
Background data (rating scales) Mann-Whitney Non-
parametric tests, and 
frequency charts 
Participant offers (dollar amounts) Regression analysis, 
frequency charts, univariate 
analysis of variance, trend 
analysis, repeated measures 
analysis of variance, and 
means 
Perception data (rating scales) Mann-Whitney Non-
parametric tests, and 
frequency charts 
 
 
 
In following sections, we will present analysis of data gathered from the 
background questionnaire, analysis of amount returned by participants, and 
analysis of data gathered through the perception questionnaire. 
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Analysis of Background Data 
Although previous studies (Hall, 1976; Hofstede, 1980) have established that the 
Chinese culture is collectivistic while the U.S. is a individualistic culture, it is 
important to analyze how the participants in this study perceive their image of self.  
The background questionnaire data helped us ascertain participants’ perception of 
self. 
 
Both Chinese and American participants completed a background questionnaire 
before playing the trust game.  The background questionnaire contained items that 
have been used in previous research to assess participants’ individualistic and 
collectivistic orientation. Refer to the appendix for a complete list of questions. 
 
We first checked to see if the background data follows a normal distribution, an 
underlying requirement for running analysis of variance tests.  Normality tests 
helped us decide between parametric and non-parametric tests for our data analysis. 
Ratings on most parameters failed the tests for normality (p>0.05) as can be see in 
Table 9. 
 
Based on the results of the normality test, we decided to proceed with the Mann-
Whitney non-parametric test.  Table 10 shows the relative ranks for the two 
cultural groups (1=China, 2=US) for the various background parameters. 
 
Table 11 shows the two tailed significance values.  Refer to Appendix A for a 
detailed list of questions presented to the participants as part of the background 
questionnaire. 
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Table 9. Tests of Normality for Background Data 
 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Country   
Stat- 
istic  df Sig. 
Stat- 
istic df  Sig. 
EnjoyBeingUniq  China .24 20 .00 .86 20  .01 
 US .22 18 .01 .83 18  .00 
LiveIndofOthers  China .22 20 .01 .88 20  .02 
 US .17 18 .13 .91 18  .08 
CoworkersWellBeing  China .25 20 .00 .80 20  .00 
 US .35 18 .00 .74 18  .00 
ChldPrdParentDist  China .31 20 .00 .74 20  .00 
 US .27 18 .00 .80 18  .00 
ComptisNecessr  China .28 20 .00 .82 20  .00 
 US .29 18 .00 .84 18  .00 
HatetoDisagree  China .20 20 .03 .92 20  .09 
 US .26 18 .00 .87 18  .02 
ISucceedbcosofmyab  China .22 20 .00 .91 20  .07 
 US .21 18 .03 .87 18  .02 
CompisLawofNat China .29 20 .00 .82 20  .00 
 US .25 18 .00 .86 18  .01 
LikeSharngwNeighb  China .14 20 .20 .94 20  .33 
 US .17 18 .15 .92 18  .15 
AgingPrntShudlvwChi  China .20 20 .02 .89 20  .03 
 US .26 18 .00 .87 18  .02 
WhatHapptomeismyDo
ing China .17 20 .09 .90 20  .06 
 US .19 18 .07 .87 18  .01 
IShudPerfmBetterTha  China .22 20 .00 .79 20  .00 
nOthers US .23 18 .01 .88 18  .03 
Tendtodomyownthing   .22 20 .01 .89 20  .03 
  .19 18 .07 .91 18  .10 
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Table 10. Background Data Relative Ranks for the Two Cultural Groups 
 
Country   
Mean 
Rank  Sum of Ranks  
EnjoyBeingUniq  China US 
17.62  
21.58  
352.50  
388.50  
LiveIndofOthers  China US 
20.78  
18.08  
415.50  
325.50  
CoworkersWellBeing 
Total  
China 
US 
19.20  
19.83  
384.00  
357.00  
ChldPrdParentDist  China US 
20.80  
18.06  
416.00  
325.00  
ComptisNecessr  China US 
22.00  
16.72  
440.00  
301.00  
HatetoDisagree  China US 
22.08  
16.64  
441.50  
299.50  
ISucceedbcosofmyablt  
 
China 
US 
 
15.82  
23.58  
316.50  
424.50  
CompisLawofNat  China  US 
20.48  
18.42  
409.50  
331.50  
LikeSharngwNeighb  China US 
16.55  
22.78  
331.00  
410.00  
AgingPrntShudlvwChild  China  US 
22.20  
16.50  
444.00  
297.00  
WhatHapptomeismyDoin 
g  
China 
US 
16.65  
22.67  
333.00  
408.00  
IShudPerfmBetterThanO 
thers  
China  
US 
25.28  
13.08  
505.50  
235.50  
Tendtodomyownthing  China  US 
14.85  
24.67  
297.00  
444.00  
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Table 11. Mann-Whitney U Test for Background Data 
 
 Mann-
Whitney 
U  
Wilcoxon 
W  
Z.  Asymp 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Exact 
Sig.  
[2*(1-
tailed 
Sig.)]  
Enjoy Being Uniq  142.5 352.5 -1.14 0.25 0.27 
LiveIndof Others  154.5 325.5 -0.76 0.44 0.46 
Cowork ersWell 
Being  
174 384 -0.19 0.84 0.87 
ChldPrdParentDist  154 325 -0.819 0.413 .46  
Comptis Necessr  130 301 -1.531 0.126 .149  
HatetoDisagree  128.5 299.5 -1.55 0.12 .13  
ISucceedb 
cosofmyabl t  
106.5 316.5 -2.26 0.02 0.03 
CompisLawof Nat  160.5 331.5 -0.6 0.54 0.57 
LikeSharng 
wNeighb  
121 331 1.7 6 0.07 0.08 
AgingPrntShu 
dlvwChild  
126 297 -1.64 0.1 .11  
WhatHapptom 
eismyDoing  
123 333 -1.7 0.08 0.09 
IShudPerfmBe 
tterThanOther s  
64.5 235.5 -3.51 0 0 
Tendtodomyo 
wnthing  
87 297 -2.79 0 0 
 
 
Responses for Chinese participants were significantly different from the US 
participants on the following: “I succeed because of my abilities”, “I should 
perform better than others”, and “I tend to do my own thing”.  The rank for 
Chinese participants on “I succeed because of my own abilities” was lower (15.82) 
than American participants (23.58).  The rating scale used on the background 
questionnaire ranged from 1 (completely disagree) to 6 (completely agree).  A 
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higher ranking for American participants indicates that they were in agreement, 
more so, than their Chinese counterparts on their attribution of any success to their 
own abilities.  Chinese participants were also ranked lower than American 
participants on ““I tend to do my own thing” which means that American 
participants seem to be more independent in thought than Chinese participants.  
However, the ranking for Chinese participants was higher than American 
participants on “I should perform better than others”. 
 
Further, frequency charts for multiple choice categorical data (e.g, one word 
description of self, preferred book, dress etc) collected in the background 
questionnaire are presented below. 
 
One question in the background questionnaire asked participants to choose a one-
word description that best describes them.  Figure 3 is a pictorial representation of 
percentage frequency of participants in each category.  Close to 30% of US 
participants chose to describe themselves as unique while only 1.25 percent of 
Chinese participants chose this option.   
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Figure 3  Frequency chart for participants’ one-word description of 
themselves 
 
 
Fifty percent of Chinese participants described themselves as cooperative while 
only 35% of US participants described themselves as cooperative.  Frequencies for 
other categories are also depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Another question asked participants to choose between dividing a bonus equally 
among employees and dividing based on performance.  Most US and Chinese 
participants thought that a bonus based on employee performance as can be seen in 
Figure 4. 
 
In Figure 5 we present the frequency distribution for participants’ criteria for 
selecting a party dress.  Approximately 66% of US participants implied that they 
would choose a party dress because they like it whereas 50% percent of Chinese 
participants choose this option.   
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Figure 4. Frequency chart for participant preference for dividing a bonus. 
 
 
Also, 45% of Chinese participants indicated that they would choose a party dress 
because everyone likes it, whereas no American participant chose this option at all.  
Interestingly, 33% of US participants thought that they would choose a party outfit 
because their friends like it.  These numbers suggest that US participants may not 
attach importance to what everyone else has to say about their outfit but they do 
care about what their friends have to say.  Chinese participants did display the 
Collectivist orientation by choosing the “Everyone Likes it” option. 
 
Figure 6 displays frequencies for participants in the 4 different criteria for joining a 
social club.  Both Chinese and American participants indicated that they would 
most often choose a club where people have the most fun. 
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Figure 5. Frequency chart for participant criteria for selecting a party outfit 
 
Approximately 26% of Chinese participants suggested that they would join a club 
where their friends and family members are already members, whereas only 11% 
of American participants chose this option suggesting that Chinese participants 
would prefer a club where they expect to see people they know, a sign of 
collectivism, as compared to the US participants.   
 
Analysis of Participant Offers  
Our research is based on our ability to simulate trust development, breakdown and 
recovery in a lab setting.  To simulate trust development, breach and recovery, we 
make use of a confederate who is responsible for sending increasingly higher pre-
decided offers in the first 10 rounds of a trust game, followed by progressively 
lower offers in the next 10 rounds and once again sending increasingly higher 
offers in the last 10 rounds. 
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Figure 6. Frequency chart for participant criteria for joining a social club 
 
 
We anticipated that participant offers would increase in response in the first 10 
rounds, decrease in the next 10, and increase again in the last 10 rounds, thereby 
simulating trust development, breakdown and recovery. 
 
In Figure 7, we plot average participant offers in response to confederate offers for 
the 30 rounds. 
 
To test whether the correlation between confederate offers and participants’ 
response was significant we conducted regression analysis on participant 
responses.  In Table 12. Mean Amount, Correlation Coefficient and Statistical 
Significance Values for offers by US and Chinese Participants, the results are listed 
separately for the two countries and for rounds 1-10, 11-20 and 21-30. 
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Figure 7. Average participant offer in response to confederate offers for all 30 
rounds 
 
 
Except for offers by US participants in rounds 11-20, all participant offers were 
highly correlated with confederate offers.  The correlation coefficient values in  
Table 12 indicate the degree to which participant offers are correlated with 
confederate offers.  Almost all correlation coefficient values are high.  As 
predicted, participants’ responses do correlate with confederate offers.  
Participants’ offers increase steadily over the first 10 rounds, decrease over the next 
10 rounds and then increase again.   
 
The level of participant responses is much higher for the last 10 rounds (rounds 21-
30) as compared to the first 10 rounds in response to similar confederate offers.   
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Table 12. Mean Amount, Correlation Coefficient and Statistical 
Significance Values for offers by US and Chinese Participants 
 
  China US 
Mean Amount ($) 38.64 36.05 
Corr-Coeff 0.984 0.997 
Rounds 
1-10 
Statistical 
Significance (p 
value) 
0 0 
Mean Amount ($) 12.33 10.43 
Corr-Coeff 0.573 0.202 
Rounds 
11-20 
Statistical 
Significance (p 
value) 
0.01 0.126 
Mean Amount ($) 62.13 56.89 
Corr-Coeff 0.957 0.99 
Rounds 
21-30 
Statistical 
Significance (p 
value) 
0 0 
 
This implies that the brief communication between the participants and the 
confederate does have a positive impact on the level of trust participants have in 
their opponents as they are willing to risk more in the last 10 rounds following their 
communication with the confederate. 
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Hypothesis Testing 
 
Our research questions investigate the following in a trust breakdown situation: 
1. Effects of media on the degree to which participants recover from a trust 
breakdown. 
2. Effects of cultural differences on the degree to which participants recover from a 
trust breakdown. 
3. Media preferences by cultural orientation for trust recovery. 
 
To test our three hypotheses we compare the regression lines for data gathered 
during rounds 21-30 for the two nationalities, and under the two media conditions. 
We plot participant offers in response to confederate offers for rounds 21-30 and fit 
a least square regression curve to the data.  Least square, by definition, minimizes 
the sum of squared residuals where residual is the difference between an observed 
value and the value obtained from the regression curve.  This results in a best 
possible fit.  We compare two aspects of regression lines using the cross-
correlations: a) whether the slopes of regression lines for relationship between 
participants’ offers in response to confederate offers are the same? b) If the slopes 
are similar, is there a difference in starting-offers (round-21) of the two regression 
lines?  The slope of the regression line represents the rate of increase in participant 
offers for the last 10 rounds.  
 
Vasalou et al (2009) tested trust recovery by evaluating participant responses in the 
very first round following trust violation and after participants received an apology 
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from the confederate. Analysis of participant offers for round 21 in our study 
would be directly comparable with analysis in Vasalou et al (2009). However, we 
extend our analysis to include all participant offers for rounds 21 through 30.  
Although analysis of participants’ offer in round 21 would have provided us with a 
measure of the extent to which participants recovered from trust, we wanted to test 
if the offers sent by participants continue to increase over the next 9 rounds. 
Secondly, in Bos et al (2002), for example, participants communicating over a 
computer media showed delayed trust development as compared to the participants 
in the face-to-face condition.  In our research, we did not have the face-to-face 
treatment condition but we were still motivated to know if trust recovery takes time 
and if it is more pronounced at the very end. 
 
To do this, we fit regression line to confederate offers (predictor variable) and 
participant offers (responsible variable) data.  Figure 8 is an illustration of two 
regression lines that have similar slopes but different starting-offers (round-21). 
Regression line A and B are curves fit to two different data sets representing 
participant offers (y) in response to confederate offers (x). The two data sets are 
represented by circles and squares. The two lines have the same slopes but the 
starting-offer (round-21) for line A is higher than that of line B. We can now use 
the regression line to estimate what the participant offer would be in response to 
the confederate offer. In Figure 8, for example, x1 is an arbitrary point representing 
an offer by confederate. Corresponding participant offers extrapolated using the 
two regression lines are y1 and y2.  Since the starting-offer (round-21) for line A is 
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higher than that of line B, participant offer for a given confederate offer is going to 
be consistently higher for line A (y1)as compared to line B (y2) even though the rate 
of increase represented by the slopes is the same for the two lines. Hence, we test 
both the slope and the starting-offer (round-21) for the two cultural groups and 
media conditions in our analysis presented below. 
 
Figure 8. Regression curve fitting - same slopes, different starting-offers 
(round-21)  
  
To test our first hypothesis (media effects), we compared slopes and starting-offers 
(round-21) of regression lines plotted for participants in response to confederate 
offers for IM and AV media conditions.  The regression graph is shown in Figure 9 
below. 
X 
Regression Line A 
Regression Line B 
y1 
y2 
Confederate offers 
Participant offers 
x1 
Y 
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Figure 9. Comparing Differences Due to medium of Communication 
 
The F and P values to check if the two regression lines coincide as well as to check 
if the starting-offers (round-21) are different are presented in Table 13. 
 
 
Table 13. Comparing Media- F and P values for test of Coincidence and 
Starting-offers (round-21) 
 
 
Media F P 
Coincidence 0.38 0.53 
Starting-offers (round-
21) 
0.22 0.63 
 
 
Based on the P values, we conclude that the slopes and starting-offers (round-21) 
are not different. Hence, we reject our hypothesis that there is a difference in how 
people recover from a trust break down situation under IM and AV media 
conditions. 
 
To test the second hypothesis we compare the regression lines for data gathered 
during rounds 21-30 for the two nationalities. We plot participant offers in response 
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to confederate offers for rounds 21-30 and fit a regression curve to the data (see 
Figure 10).  Regression analyses for the two data sets resulted in a F value of 0.36 
and P of 0.5453.  In other words, there is a 55% chance of randomly choosing data 
points with slopes this different.  Hence, we conclude that the difference between 
the slopes for the two countries is not significantly different.  
 
 
 
Figure 10. Participant offers in response to confederate offers for rounds 21-
30. 
 
Next, we check if the starting-offers (round-21) are significantly different.  
Analyses to determine significant differences in the average starting-offers (round-
21) for the two cultural groups resulted in a F value of 6.85 and P value of 0.009.  
In other words, if the overall starting-offers (round-21) were identical, there is a 
0.92% chance of randomly choosing data points with starting-offers (round-21) this 
different. Hence, we conclude that the differences between the average starting-
offers (round-21) for US and Chinese participants are significantly different. 
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Our third hypothesis states that collectivists will prefer to communicate their 
differences over a richer medium (e.g., audiovisual chat).  Individualists, on the 
other hand, will prefer to communicate their differences over less richer medium 
such as text messaging. To test our third hypothesis we compared regression slopes 
for Chinese participants in IM condition with offers from Chinese participants in 
the AV condition and compared slopes for offers from US participants in IM and 
AV condition.  Table 14 shows the F and P values for coincidence and average 
starting-offers (round-21) for the regression lines. 
 
Table 14. Media Preferences-F and P values for test of coincidence and 
starting-offers (Round-21) 
 
 
Media (IM Vs 
AV) 
FChinaMedia PChinaMedia FUSMedia PUSMedia 
Coincidence 1.00 0.31 0.18 0.66 
Starting-offers 
(round-21) 
0.55 0.45 5.10 0.02 
 
 
The slopes and average starting-offers (round-21) by Chinese participants in the 
two media conditions were not significantly different. However, average starting-
offers (round-21) by US participants were significantly different for IM and AV 
media conditions (P=0.02).   
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Figure 11. Comparing offers by Chinese participants in IM and AV media 
conditions. 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Comparing offers by US participants in IM and AV media 
conditions. 
 
The average starting-offers (round-21) by US participants’ offers in the AV 
condition were significantly higher than their counterparts in the IM condition. 
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Analysis of offers in round 21 
 
We isolate participant offers in Round 21 for our analyses as it is the very first 
round following trust breakdown.  Note that, following round 20, participants were 
provided with an opportunity to communicate with the confederate to clear out any 
differences.  Offers in round 21, hence, represent how the participants perceive 
their opponent (confederate) following a trust breakdown and after an opportunity 
to reconcile.   
 
To investigate differences in mean for the two cultural groups and also across the 
two media conditions we conducted a univariate analysis of variance with country 
and media as the independent variables and the amount returned by participants 
(receiver) for round 21 as a the dependent variable.  Results of the analysis are 
shown in Table 15 and Table 16. Although non-parametric tests would have been a 
safer choice, they tend to be less powerful than their parametric counterparts. 
Parametric tests on the other hand tend to be powerful but require two key 
assumptions: 1) Data has to be normally distributed 2) Samples need to be 
randomly drawn. Both of these assumptions tend to be valid for continuous 
variables such as dollar amounts that we use for analysis of participant offers.   
Also, previous research studies (e.g., Nguyen  & Canny, 2007 & Zheng et al, 2002) 
have effectively measured trust using parametric tests such as analysis of variances 
of participant offers in games similar to ours. Hence, we choose parametric tests for 
analysis. 
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Table 15. Average participant offers by participants for round 21. 
 
 
Country Media Mean
Std. 
Deviation 
IM 34.10 14.80
AudVid 40.75 9.27
China 
Total 37.06 12.76
IM 33.13 7.99
AudVid 33.78 8.28
US 
Total 33.47 7.89
IM 33.67 11.94
AudVid 37.06 9.20
Total 
Total 35.31 10.68
 
For round 21 the pre-decided amount sent by the confederate was $20, which 
meant that all participants received $60 (20 x 3).  The descriptive statistics in Table 
15 show that, out of a possible $60, the average amounts sent by Chinese 
participants were $34.10 and $40.75 for audio and audio-visual conditions 
respectively, whereas, for US participants, the average amounts were $33.13 and 
$33.78 for audio and audio-visual media conditions respectively.  These results 
indicate that the amounts for the two media conditions are almost the same for US 
participants, while the amount sent by Chinese participants in the audio-visual 
condition was 19.5 % higher than their counterparts in the audio conditions.  The 
mean amounts returned for the two media conditions and countries are graphically 
depicted in Figure 13 below. 
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Figure 13. Average Amount Returned by Participants for Round 21. 
 
Table 16. Two-way Analysis of variances (Country x Media) of participant 
offers for round 21. 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected 
Model 
310.71a 3 103.57 .89 .45 
Starting-
offers (round-
21) 
43577.02 1 43577.02 378.31 .00 
CountryCode 136.97 1 136.97 1.18 .28 
MediaCode 115.65 1 115.65 1.00 .32 
CountryCode 
* MediaCode 
78.00 1 78.00 .67 .41 
Error 3570.83 31 115.18   
Total 47530.00 35    
Corrected 
Total 
3881.54 34    
 
IM 
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Results from analysis of variance are presented in Table 16.  There was neither a 
statistically significant effect of the country and media conditions nor a interaction 
effect as seen from the p values in the table.  The higher amount returned in the 
audio-visual condition for Chinese participants failed to be significant.   
 
Repeated Measures Analyses for Rounds 21-30 
To assess differences in means for the last 10 rounds (rounds 21-30) we conducted 
a repeated measures analysis of variance with country and media condition as the 
independent measure and amount returned by the participant (sender) as the 
dependent measure repeated over 10 trials (rounds 21-30).  The results from these 
analyses are presented in Table 17.  Note that the within subject factor, Rounds 
(21-30), was significant at p<0.05.  However, there was no interaction effect for 
country and media conditions.  This means that participant offers vary across the 
10 trials (rounds 21-30) and significantly so.  To further explore the nature of 
relationship between the round numbers, and hence confederate offers, and the 
amount sent by the participants we conducted trend analysis using contrasts.  The 
results from this analysis are shown in Table 18. 
 
Table 18 shows that there is a significant linear (p<0.05), quadratic (p<0.05) and 
cubic (p<0.05) relationship between the round numbers and the amount sent by the 
participants.  This can be explained by the progressively increasing amounts sent 
by the confederate beginning with round 21 and ending at round 30.   
 
  
86
The results indicate the increased amounts sent by the confederate were matched 
proportionally by the participants from both countries under both media conditions.  
The quadratic nature of relationship also indicates participants send increasingly 
higher offers in the beginning but eventually the offers level off.   
 
Table 17.  Repeated measures analysis of variance for rounds 21-30. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Sphericity Assumed 45905.07 5100.56 35.541 .00 
Greenhouse-Geisser 45905.07 22908.72 35.541 .00 
Huynh-Feldt 45905.07 19433.92 35.541 .00 
Rounds21_30 
Lower-bound 45905.07 45905.07 35.541 .00 
Sphericity Assumed 599.65 66.62 .464 .89 
Greenhouse-Geisser 599.65 299.25 .464 .63 
Huynh-Feldt 599.65 253.86 .464 .66 
rounds21_30 * 
Country 
Lower-bound 599.65 599.65 .464 .50 
Sphericity Assumed 433.30 48.14 .335 .96 
Greenhouse-Geisser 433.30 216.23 .335 .71 
Huynh-Feldt 433.30 183.43 .335 .75 
rounds21_30 * 
Media 
Lower-bound 433.30 433.30 .335 .56 
Sphericity Assumed 641.88 71.32 .497 .87 
Greenhouse-Geisser 641.88 320.33 .497 .61 
Huynh-Feldt 641.88 271.74 .497 .64 
rounds21_30 * 
Country  *  
Media 
Lower-bound 641.88 641.88 .497 .48 
Sphericity Assumed 38748.35 143.51   
Greenhouse-Geisser 38748.35 644.57   
Huynh-Feldt 38748.35 546.80   
Error(rounds21
_30) 
Lower-bound 38748.35 1291.61   
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The charts in Figure 14 through Figure 17 provide a pictorial representation of this 
relationship overall and for various independent variable combinations. 
 
Overall, all participants in both cultural groups and media conditions showed signs 
of trust recovery as seen from the graph in Figure 14.  Note that average participant 
offer increased steadily in response to confederate offers over the last 10 rounds.  
Allowing participants to communicate with the confederate seemed to have helped 
them reconcile. Specifically, confederate's explanation for not sending higher 
offers in rounds 11-20 may have played a significant role in assuaging participants' 
negative feelings towards the confederate. 
 
Table 18. Nature of relationship of participant offers with confederate offers 
 
Source 
rounds21
_30 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Linear 41062.066 1 41062.066 135.54 .00
Quad 4194.397 1 4194.397 5.49 .02
Round 
21_30 
Cubic 315.756 1 315.756 9.52 .00
Linear 9088.046 30 302.935   
Quad 22882.953 30 762.765   
Error 
21_30 
Cubic 994.324 30 33.144   
  
This result is in line with findings in other studies (e.g., Vasalou et al, 2009) where 
accepting blame for a wrongdoing produced positive results in subsequent 
transactions. This result holds true regardless of participants' background or the 
medium of communication as observed in Figure 15, Figure 16, and Figure 17.  
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Figure 14. Overall average amount returned by participants for rounds 21-30 
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Figure 15. Country-wise average amount returned by participants for rounds 
21-30. 
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Figure 16. Media-wise average amount returned by participants for rounds 
21-30. 
 
Average offers by Chinese participants were observed to be slightly higher (Figure 
15) than those of US participants. Once again, participant offers increased in 
tandem with confederate for both groups. IM and AV media conditions did not 
show much difference (Figure 16).  In Figure 17, we plot participant offers separate 
for the two cultural groups and by media conditions. As seen in the figure, US 
participants' offers were higher in the AV condition as compared to the 
counterparts in the IM condition.  Otherwise, offers by Chinese participants in the 
two media condition were almost the same. 
IM 
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Figure 17. Average amount returned by participant for rounds 21-30 by 
country/media 
 
In addition to the analyses of offers sent by participants we also analyze the 
perception ratings provided by participants at the end of round 10, 20 and 30.  
Participants provided their ratings on a 6-point (1=completely disagree, 
6=completely agree) Likert scale on the following parameters: 
1. Satisfied with how the results in the last 10 rounds have turned out 
2. Happy with how my opponent is cooperating 
3. Friendliness of opponent 
4. Pleasantness of opponent 
5. Trustworthiness 
6. Honesty 
7. Reasonability of opponent 
8. Sincerity 
9. Flexibility 
IM 
IM 
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10. Reliability 
11. Likelihood to trust opponent in the future 
 
To assess if the above parameters measure the same construct, we subjected these 
ratings to the Cronbach’s alpha test.  The alpha value was found to be 0.904 
indicating a very high correlation between the various scales.  Hence, we present 
average ratings for some of the above parameters, and not all. 
 
We first tested the perception data gathered after round 20 (trust violation) to see if 
it violates the assumption of normality.  Table 19 shows the results from the 
normality check. 
 
Rating scale data such as the ones used in our research tend to be skewed in one 
direction especially when measuring trustworthiness after a breakdown. Participant 
ratings did congregate either near the high end of the scale (high trustworthiness) or 
near the lower end (low trustworthiness). Analysis of variance assumption of data 
being normally distributed invariably does not hold true in such cases as we 
observed through tests of normality results.   
 
Analysis of medians using non-parametric tests in such cases is more valid because 
it takes the skewness into account. Hence we choose a non-parametric tests for the 
analyses of perception data.  Participant ratings for most perception parameters 
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failed the normality test at p<0.05 and hence the null hypotheses that the data 
follows normal distribution is not supported.   
 
Table 19. Tests of Normality for Perception Data Gathered After Round 20 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnova Shap iro-Wilk  
 Country 
Stat   
Sig. 
Stat  
Sig.  
HappywResults China .13 .20* .94 .51  
 US .29 .00 .86 .02 
HappywOpp  China .25 .01 .88 .05  
 US .26 .00 .82 .00  
Friendly  China .30 .00 .75 .00  
  US .24 .01 .87 .03  
Pleasant  China .31 .00 .80 .00  
  US .23 .02 .88 .05  
Trustwrthy  China .25 .01 .91 .15  
  US .24 .01 .87 .04  
Honesty  China .20 .08 .917  .17  
 US  .23 .02 .910  .13  
Reasonable  China .13 .20 .949  .50  
 US  .24 .01 .866  .03  
Insincere  China .25 .01 .913  .15  
 US  .21 .06 .859  .02  
Flexible  China .20 .09 .917  .17  
 US  .23 .02 .911  .14  
Reliable  China .18 .17 .924  .22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
93
 
Table 20. Analyses of Participants’ Perception Rating After Round 20 using 
Mann-Whitney Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Normal distribution of data being one of the important assumptions for parametric 
analysis of data, we decided to choose the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test with 
the country as the independent variable and the participant ratings on the various 
perception parameters collected after round 20 as the dependent measure.  Results 
from this analysis are shown in Table 20.   
 
No significant differences were found between the American and Chinese cultural 
groups.  These results suggest that the extent of trust violation was perceived to be 
similar for the two cultural groups.   
 
  Mann-
Whitney 
U 
Wilcoxon 
W 
Z Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Exact Sig. 
[2*(1-tailed 
Sig.)] 
HappywResults 155 308 -0.211 0.833 .851 
HappywOpp 151 304 -0.34 0.73 0.75 
Friendly 135.5 325.5 -0.86 0.39 0.41 
Pleasant 150 303 -0.38 0.7 0.73 
Trustwrthy 141 294 -0.67 0.5 0.53 
Honesty 143.5 296.5 -0.58 0.55 0.57 
Reasonable 117.5 270.5 -1.42 0.15 0.16 
Insincere 148.5 301.5 -0.15 0.87 0.88 
Flexible 133 286 -0.67 0.49 0.52 
Reliable 117.5 270.5 -0.68 0.49 0.51 
LikelytoTrustOpp 103.5 256.5 -1.67 0.09 0.1 
LikelytoContiBusRel 128.5 281.5 -0.82 0.4 0.42 
Forgive 88.5 241.5 -1.51 0.13 0.14 
RebuildRel 112 283 -0.86 0.38 0.42 
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Table 21. Tests of Normality for Perception Data Gathered After Round 30 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk  
Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig. 
HappywResultsRecov .25 .00 .80 .00 
HappywOppCoopRecov  .00 .80 .00 
FriendlyRecov .29 .00 .78 .00 
PleasntRecov .22 .00 .82 .00 
ReasonbRecov .27 .00 .82 .00 
SincereRecov .23 .00 .82 .00 
FlexRecov .17 .03 .88 .00 
ReliabRecov .25 .00 .81 .00 
LikelytoTrustRecov .24 .00 .84 .00 
 
 
Similarly, we tested the normality for perception data gathered after round 30 and 
found that the test failed for all the parameters (see Table 21).  As a result, we 
analyzed this data using the Mann-Whitney test.  Results from this non-parametric 
test are shown in Table 22.  Mann-Whitney test did not show any significant 
differences for the various perception questions for the two cultural groups. Based 
on the perception questions, it did not seem that the extent to which participants 
recovered following trust breakdown was different for the two cultural groups. 
 
 
Next, we analyzed the impact of media on participants’ perception following trust 
recovery by subjecting the participants’ responses to perception questionnaire, 
following round 30, to Mann-Whitney test.  Results from these analyses is shown 
in Table 23. 
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Table 22. Cultural Differences: Analyses of Participants’ Perception Rating 
After Round 30 using Mann-Whitney Test 
 
  Mann-
Whitney 
U 
Wilcoxon 
W 
Z Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Exact 
Sig. 
[2*(1-
tailed 
Sig.)] 
Happyw-Results 140 293 -0.46 0.64 0.68 
Happy-w-Opp-
Coop 138.5 291.5 -0.53 0.59 .63 
Friendly 122.5 293.5 -1.1 0.26 .31 
Pleasant 148 319 -0.17 0.86 0.88 
Trustwrthy 138 309 -0.52 0.6 0.63 
Honest 142.5 313.5 -0.36 0.71 0.73 
Reasonb 151 322 -0.07 0.94 0.96 
Sincere 139.5 310.5 -0.47 0.63 0.66 
Flex 111.5 264.5 -0.3 0.76 0.76 
Reliab 100.5 191.5 -0.44 0.65 0.68 
LikelytoTrust 116.5 221.5 -0.1 0.91 0.92 
 
 
No significant differences were found across the two media conditions.  However, 
one result worth noting is the difference between participants’ perception of 
opponents’ (confederate’s) reliability approached significance (p=0.06), with 
participants in the AV condition being ranked higher than participants in IM 
condition.  In other words, participants in the AV condition found their confederate 
to be more reliable than participants in the IM condition.   
 
Table 24 shows average ratings for the “satisfaction with outcome” parameter for 
participants from China and US and across the two media conditions.  The baseline 
ratings are provided by participants following round 10; trust breakdown rating are 
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provided after round 20; and trust recovery ratings are provided at the end of round 
30. 
Table 23. Media  Differences: Analyses of Participants’ Perception Rating 
After Round 30 using Mann-Whitney Test 
 
  Mann-
Whitney 
U 
Wilcoxon 
W 
Z Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
HappywResults 114.5 250.5 -1.33 0.18 
HappywOpp 127 263 -0.92 0.36 
Friendly 141.5 331.5 -0.38 0.7 
Pleasant 132.5 322.5 -0.69 0.49 
Trustwrthy 137 327 -0.53 0.6 
Honesty 146.5 336.5 -0.19 0.85 
Reasonable 135 325 -0.59 0.55 
Insincere 135.5 325.5 -0.58 0.56 
Flexible 115.5 305.5 -0.96 0.34 
Reliable 85 256 -1.89 0.06 
LikelytoTrustOpp 119.5 309.5 -0.83 0.4 
LikelytoContaBusRel 126 316 -0.6 0.55 
 
 
Participants’ mean rating provided at the end of round 20 (breakdown) are 
considerably lower than rating at the end of round 10 and round 30.  The graph in  
Figure 18 is a pictorial representation of the data Table 24. 
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Table 24. Average Ratings for “Satisfaction with Outcome of the Game” 
 
 
Baseline (Round 10) Breakdown (Round 
20) 
Recovery 
(Round 30) 
 
IM AudVid IM 
 
AudVid IM 
 
AudVid 
 
China 5.3 4.8 3.1 2.7 5.3 4.75 
US 4.66 4.55 2.55 3.12 5.33 4.50 
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Figure 18. Average rating for participants’ perception of a satisfaction with 
outcome of the game 
 
Although participants’ satisfaction with outcome rating recovered to the original 
levels after round 30, for US participants in instant messaging conditions, the 
satisfaction levels were higher (5.3) than their baseline (4.6) satisfaction ratings.   
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Average ratings for participant’s perception of their opponent’s friendliness are 
summarized in Table 25. 
 
Table 25. Participants’ Perception of Opponent’s Friendliness 
 
Baseline (Round 
10) 
Breakdown 
(Round 20) 
Recovery (Round 
30) 
 
IM AudVid IM 
 
AudV
id 
IM 
 
Aud
Vid 
 
China 5.5 5 3.1 2.6 4.6 5.12 
US 5.0 5.1 2.66 3.5 5.44 5.37 
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Figure 19. Average rating for participants’ perception of opponent’s 
friendliness 
 
Figure 19 shows that Chinese participants’ perception of opponent’s friendliness 
was higher after round 30 under audio-visual condition (5.125) as compared to the 
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instant messaging condition (4.6).  US participants rated higher, although slightly, 
under the instant messaging condition (5.44) as compared to the audio-visual 
condition (5.37) following round 30.  However, as compared to the Chinese 
participants, US participants’ perception of opponent’s friendliness was higher 
under both instant messaging and audio-visual condition after round 30.   
 
Similarly Table 26 compares mean ratings for trustworthiness of opponent. 
 
 
Table 26. Participants’ perception of opponent’s trustworthiness 
 
Baseline (Round 10) Breakdown (Round 
20) 
Recovery (Round 
30) 
 
IM AudVid IM 
 
AudVid IM 
 
AudVid 
 
China 5 4.6 3.2 2.6 4.6 5.25 
US 4.55 5.22 2.55 2.75 5.22 5 
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Figure 20.  Average rating for participants’ perception of opponent’s 
trustworthiness 
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Chinese participants’ rating for trustworthiness of opponent was higher (4.6) at the 
end of round 30 in audio-visual condition as compared to their baseline rating 
(5.25).  Also, US participants rated higher (5.22) at the end of round 30 under the 
instant-messaging condition as compared to their baseline rating (4.55).  These 
results suggest that Chinese participants recovered better under audio-video 
condition as compared to the instant-messaging condition and vice-versa for the US 
participants. 
 
Qualitative measure provided by participants correspond well with the objective 
measure represented by the lower amounts returned for rounds 11-20, which 
simulated trust breakdown. 
 
We analyzed the ratings using a repeated measures design because we wanted to 
investigate how the ratings change from the baseline (rounds 1-10) through 
breakdown (rounds 11-20), and if participants recover at all (rounds 21-30).  As a 
result we have three repeated measures for each of the dimensions above: one after 
round 10, another one after round 20, and the last one after round 30.  Results from 
these analyses are presented in Table 27. 
 
Because data in repeated measures comes from same individuals, data points 
cannot be considered independent of each other (an assumption for parametric 
tests).  Hence, repeated measures analysis requires an additional assumption. The 
assumption is that the difference in dependent measures (participant offers) for 
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pairs of treatment levels (rounds or confederate offers) have equal variances. This 
assumption is commonly referred to as the assumption of sphericity.  
 
In our case, the data violated this assumption. Often, there are corrections we can 
apply to derive an F-ratio that is valid. These involve reducing the degrees of 
freedom thereby making the F-ratio more conservative.  
 
Table 27. Repeated measure analysis of participants’ perception of satisfaction 
with results 
 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Sphericity Assumed 96.09 2 48.04 27.21 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 96.09 1.69 56.55 27.21 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 96.09 1.96 48.99 27.21 .000 
Rounds 
Lower-bound 96.09 1.00 96.09 27.21 .000 
Sphericity Assumed 1.28 2 .64 .36 .69 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.28 1.69 .75 .36 .66 
Huynh-Feldt 1.28 1.96 .65 .36 .69 
Rounds * 
Country 
Lower-bound 1.28 1.00 1.28 .36 .55 
Sphericity Assumed 2.80 2 1.40 .79 .45 
Greenhouse-Geisser 2.80 1.69 1.65 .79 .43 
Huynh-Feldt 2.80 1.96 1.43 .79 .45 
Rounds * 
Media 
Lower-bound 2.80 1.00 2.80 .79 .38 
Sphericity Assumed 1.61 2 .80 .45 .63 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.61 1.69 .95 .45 .60 
Huynh-Feldt 1.61 1.96 .82 .45 .63 
Rounds * 
Country  *  
Media 
Lower-bound 1.61 1.00 1.61 .45 .50 
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The three different estimates of sphericity used to correct the degrees of freedom 
are 1) Greenhouse-Geisser 2) Huynh and Feldt’s and 3) The lower bound estimate 
(Field, 2009). 
 
The statistical software SPSS® checks for violation of sphericity assumption when 
conducting repeated measures analysis and also provides the three correction 
factors. For instance, the within-subject variable, “Rounds”, in our case violated the 
assumption of sphericity and SPSS produced the correct factors for Greenhouse-
Geisser, Huynh-Feldt’s and Lower bound estimate as 0.84, 0.98, and 0.5 
respectively.  We multiply the degrees of freedom for “Rounds” with these factors 
to reduce the number of degrees of freedom. The corrected degrees of freedom are 
shown in Table 27.  Which of the three estimates do we use for our analysis?  If 
any one of the correction factor is greater than 0.75 then we use Huynh-Feldt as the 
correction factor (Field, 2009).  Similarly, degrees of freedom for other variable 
interactions are computed and shown in Table 27.  Subsequent repeated measures 
analysis reported in Table 28 and Table 29 also follow the same assumption of 
sphericity.  Participants’ perception of satisfaction with the results of preceding 10 
rounds of the trust game was found to be statistically significant (p<0.05) using 
Huynh-Feldt’s correction factor as can be seen from Table 27.  Participants’ 
perception varied significantly (p<0.05) across the three repeated measures 
recorded at the end of round 10, 20, and 30.  The mean rating for the two countries 
and media conditions after round 10 was 4.86 out of a possible 6.  The mean rating 
after round 20 was 2.88 and the mean rating after round 30 was 4.97.  The 
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significant results obtained in the repeated measure analysis can explained due to a 
big drop in participant ratings recorded after round 20.  Note that, for rounds 11-20, 
the confederate sent back decreasingly lower amounts to instigate a trust 
breakdown.  Lower participant rating at the end of round 20 is a good measure of 
our success in simulating a trust breakdown.   
 
Next, we analyzed participant ratings on their perception of opponent’s friendliness 
and trustworthiness. Table 28 and Table 29 summarize the results from these 
analyses. 
Table 28. Repeated measure analysis of participants’ perception of opponent’s 
friendliness 
 
Source Sum of Squares Df Mean Sq F Sig.
Sphericity Assumed 110.87 2 55.44 60.01 .00
Greenhouse-Geisser 110.87 1.78 62.148 60.01 .00
Huynh-Feldt 110.87 2.00 55.44 60.01 .00
Rounds 
Lower-bound 110.87 1.00 110.87 60.01 .00
Sphericity Assumed 2.78 2 1.39 1.50 .22
Greenhouse-Geisser 2.78 1.78 1.56 1.50 .23
Huynh-Feldt 2.78 2.00 1.39 1.50 .22
Rounds * 
Country 
Lower-bound 2.78 1.00 2.78 1.50 .22
Sphericity Assumed .63 2 .31 .34 .71
Greenhouse-Geisser .63 1.78 .35 .34 .68
Huynh-Feldt .63 2.00 .31 .34 .71
Rounds * Media 
Lower-bound .63 1.00 .63 .34 .56
Sphericity Assumed 3.95 2 1.97 2.14 .12
Greenhouse-Geisser 3.95 1.78 2.21 2.14 .13
Huynh-Feldt 3.95 2.00 1.97 2.14 .12
Rounds * 
Country  *  
Media 
Lower-bound 3.95 1.00 3.95 2.14 .15
 
  
104
Once again, the ratings were significantly different across the three repetitions, 
with considerably lower ratings due to trust breakdown in rounds 11-20.   
 
Table 29  Repeated measure analysis of participants’ perception of opponent’s 
trustworthiness 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Sphericity Assumed 107.89 2 53.94 49.33 .00
Greenhouse-Geisser 107.89 1.90 56.59 49.33 .00
Huynh-Feldt 107.89 2.00 53.94 49.33 .00
Rounds 
Lower-bound 107.89 1.00 107.89 49.33 .00
Sphericity Assumed .86 2 .43 .39 .67
Greenhouse-Geisser .86 1.90 .45 .39 .66
Huynh-Feldt .86 2.00 .43 .39 .67
Rounds * 
Country 
Lower-bound .86 1.00 .86 .39 .53
Sphericity Assumed .83 2 .41 .38 .68
Greenhouse-Geisser .83 1.90 .43 .38 .67
Huynh-Feldt .83 2.00 .41 .38 .68
Rounds * 
Media 
Lower-bound .83 1.00 .83 .38 .54
Sphericity Assumed 4.01 2 2.00 1.83 .16
Greenhouse-Geisser 4.01 1.90 2.10 1.83 .17
Huynh-Feldt 4.01 2.00 2.00 1.83 .16
Rounds * 
Country  *  
Media 
Lower-bound 4.01 1.00 4.01 1.83 .18
 
In general, repeated measures analysis of participant perception data showed that 
participants considered their opponent to be trustworthy after the first 10 rounds, 
not trustworthy after rounds 11-20 and once again changed their perception about 
their opponent to trustworthy after rounds 21-30. In conjunction with participant 
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offers, this result validates our conclusion about the success we achieved in 
simulating trust development, breakdown and repair. 
 
Preference for Communication Medium 
Participants’ preference for medium of communication with their opponent was 
recorded at the end of round 30.  Participants were requested to choose from the 
following options: face-to-face, email, instant messaging, audio-visual over the 
web, and phone.  The audio-visual web based medium is almost similar to face-to-
face as it provides both aural and visual cues.  Hence, we combine these two media 
for our analysis 
 
Table 30 provides a percentage for participants in each category for Chinese and 
US participants. Within each cultural group, only 17 participants responded to the 
multiple choice question regarding preference for a communication medium. Three 
participants in each cultural group did not provide their response on this question. 
 
Table 30 Participants preference for communication media as a percentage 
 
 
 Face-to-
Face 
Instant 
Messaging 
Email Phone 
US 64.7 29.41 0 5.88 
China 70.58 11.76 11.78 5.88 
 
 
Figure 21 depicts the above data in a chart format for easy comparison. 
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Figure 21. Participants’ preference for medium of communication 
 
 
Chinese participant seem to prefer to communicate with their opponent face-to-
face.  Face-to-face was also preferred over other channels by US participants.  
However, a substantial number of participants (29.4%) also showed preference for 
the instant-messaging medium of communication. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
We designed our research to test the following three hypotheses: 
1. Individuals are likely to achieve a higher degree of reconciliation following an 
untrustworthy behavior when they receive clarifications from their opponents 
over a less rich media as compared to individuals communicated to over a 
richer media. 
2. Individuals from collectivist cultures are more likely to achieve higher degree 
of reconciliation following an untrustworthy behavior when they receive a 
clarification from their partners as compared to individuals from individualistic 
cultures. 
3. Following breach of trust, collectivists will prefer to communicate their 
differences over a richer medium (e.g., audiovisual chat).  Individualists, on the 
other hand, will prefer to communicate their differences over less richer 
medium such as text messaging. 
 
In this section, we will discuss how the outcomes from this research study relate to 
other similar studies conducted in the past.   
 
Effect of Media Differences on Reconciliation following Breakdown 
 
Several studies in the past (Bos et al, 2002; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999; McEvily et 
al, 2006; Rocco, 1998; and Zheng et al, 2002) have assessed the role of media in 
trust development. In the current research we were interested in investigating if 
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media has an impact on the degree to which people reconcile following a trust 
breakdown. The degree to which participant in our research study reconciled was 
not significantly different under the IM and AV media conditions.  
 
For the type and duration of communication between the participants and the 
confederate, the medium of communication did not have an impact on the extent to 
which participants recover from a trust breakdown. This result is contrary to our 
expectations that individuals may recover better under IM condition because trust 
breakdown is a conflict situation and people may want to avoid seeing each other. 
Part of the reason could be that text-based messaging has advanced significantly 
since its inception. For example, IM now allows participants to communicate affect 
using icons.  For instance, in Park (2008), analysis of textual transcripts of 
participants communicating over a synchronous text based communication channel 
showed that they use several alternative strategies, such as smiley faces, to 
overcome the shortcomings of the text-based communication medium. Findings in 
DeLuca, Gasson & Kock (2006) were similar as well.  In other words, people may 
devise different ways to communicate affect even with a less rich medium such as 
IM. By implication, this would mean that the richness of IM medium may be very 
close to that of the AV channel of communication and this may explain why we did 
not see an impact of medium of communication on trust recovery.  
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Effects of Cultural Differences on Reconciliation Following Breakdown 
 
Prior research (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Rahim, 1991; Ting-Toomey et al, 
1991) has shown that people from Collectivist societies are likely to a adopt a more 
obliging and avoiding conflict styles and adopt strategies that are mutually 
beneficial when faced with conflict situations.  Based on analysis of data from our 
study, we can conclude that the effect of explanatory variable (confederate offers) 
on the response variable (participant offers) is the same for participants from the 
two countries.  But, the starting-offers (round-21) were slightly different.  Chinese 
participants began with slightly higher offers as compared to the US participants 
but, over the course of 10 rounds, the rate of increase in offers by participants in 
the two countries was the same.  This result offers some support to our hypothesis 
about cultural differences having an impact on the degree to which people 
reconcile with Chinese participants (Collectivists) showing a slightly higher level 
of reconciliation as compared to US participants (Individualists).  To have 
completely proved our hypothesis, we would need both the slope and the starting-
offers to be significantly higher for Chinese participants in comparison with US 
participants. However, that was not the case. This is an interesting finding. 
Although the self-reported measures in the background questionnaire pointed to 
stark differences on several parameters of cultural orientation (e.g., description of 
self, attribution of success/failure to one’s own doing etc) for the two cultural 
groups, these differences did not matter much when it came to recovering from 
trust breakdown situation. That is not to say cultural differences do not exist 
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between the two groups, they do. But, they don’t seem to be influencing recovery 
behavior following trust breakdown. Given the pervasive reach of media such as 
Television and Internet, Chinese people are now exposed to the same type of 
cultural influences as Americans which may have led to behavior patterns that are 
less distinct and more homogeneous than observed in previous research discussed 
earlier in our literature review.  However, one caveat is worth mentioning: cultural 
differences did not matter for a specific trust repair task chosen in this study and 
this finding is generalizable to tasks of similar nature. It is quite possible that 
cultural differences are pronounced for other tasks where societal norms play a 
prominent role (e.g., trust repair when the violator is a family member) and may be 
worth researching. The nature of task employed in this study is more business-like 
and may not have brought about strong emotional behavior which could a reason 
why we did not see any impact of cultural differences.  
  
During rounds 11-20, the rate at which offers by Chinese participants dropped was 
also slower as compared to that by US participants (see Figure 7) which means that 
Chinese participants continued to trust the confederate even as the confederate sent 
increasingly lower offers for rounds 11-20.  Hence, it is likely that reconciliation in 
case of Chinese participants was easier because they continued to trust the 
confederate. Is trust more fragile in case of Individualists as compared to 
Collectivists?  This is an interesting question that may need to be researched 
further.  
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Opponent’s trustworthiness measured by participants’ offers for rounds 21-30 was 
much higher than the baseline (see Figure 7) trustworthiness perception.  This 
result indicates that participants trust their opponent to a greater extent after having 
a brief conversation (after round 20) as compared to the baseline condition (rounds 
1-10) when they have had no chance to communicate with their opponent. This 
result is in line with Rocco’s (1998) findings where the participants who had the 
chance of a pre-task face-to-face meeting were highly trusting of their opponents. 
 
Media Preferences 
No support was found for our third hypothesis about media preferences.  However, 
the starting-offers (round-21) were significantly higher for US participants in the 
AV condition as compared to US participants in the IM condition.  For US 
participants, this means that extrapolation of participant offers for a specific 
confederate offer would be consistently higher in AV condition as compared to IM 
condition. However, the rate at which they increased their offers were not any 
different for the two media conditions. This result indicates that US participants 
may have preferred AV medium over IM which is in contrast to our third 
hypothesis.  Also, when asked to pick a preferred communication medium, close to 
65% of US participants preferred face-to-face and 28% preferred IM. The numbers 
were similar for Chinese participants. Although high-context and low-context 
theory proposed by Hall (1976) suggests that people from individualistic societies 
may prefer low-context communication (afforded by IM), the nature of task may 
significantly influence participants’ media choice. For example, when a task 
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involves communication that is intricate as in the case of a trust violation, 
participants may generally prefer a richer medium for communication.   
 
Effectiveness of Trust Games in Simulating Trust Development and Breach of 
Trust 
 
The trust game allowed us to successfully simulate trust development and breach. 
Until recently (e.g., Vasalou et al, 2009) literature on use of trust games to study 
trust development and repair in computer mediated communication environment 
has been sparse.  Although breach of trust situations occur quite often, studying 
trust repair in real world settings is difficult because identifying and following up 
with parties whose trust has been violated would be a challenging task.  Controlled 
experiments using trust games make assessment of test trust repair fairly simple.   
 
Figure 7 is an objective indication of the efficacy of trust games in simulating trust 
development and breach.  Apart from that, participants’ subjective perception 
(Figure 20) about their opponent’s trustworthiness further validates the 
appropriateness of trust games.  The baseline (round 10) and recovery (round 30) 
ratings for trustworthiness were found to be high, while the rating was low at the 
end of round 20 indicating trust breakdown. Further, the perception ratings for the 
various parameters (e.g., satisfaction with outcome, trustworthiness of opponent) 
showed high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.9) indicating that the 
parameters we employed to measure participants’ perception were indeed 
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measuring the same construct. Hence, the trend in baseline and recovery ratings, by 
extension, applies to all the perception parameters in our study. 
 
Threats to Validity 
We would like to discuss two types of threats to validity of our results: internal and 
external. Internal validity refers to our ability to effectively measure trust using 
participant offers in the trust game. How do we know that participant offers are a 
true reflection of the extent to which participants trust their opponent? We address 
this threat by employing a secondary measure of trust in the form of self-reported 
ratings by participants on various perception parameters such as opponent’s 
trustworthiness, likelihood to continue a business relationship with their opponent 
in the future etc. Ratings by participants on these parameters aligned well with the 
actual offers sent by them during the game. For example, Figure 20 shows how 
participants’ ratings are high after rounds 1-10 (trust development), low after 
rounds 11-20, and high, again, after rounds 21-30. We believe these ratings serve 
as a validation for offers sent by participants in the trust game. 
 
External validity refers to how well our results generalize to real-world trust repair 
situations.  Our sample size may pose some risks to the external validity of our 
results. However, we believe our attempt is a start in the right direction and may 
prompt large-scale research on trust repair under cultural and media conditions. 
Secondly, results from our research do apply in short-lived real-life collaborations 
by virtual team members on one-time projects identified by Mayerson, Weick & 
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Kramer (1996). But there may be other trust-based relationships between parties 
that have been built over a significant amount of time (e.g., years). Our research 
does not extend to these situations. For example, trust recovery following a 
breakdown may be much slower when the victim has been trusting of the offender 
for a long time because the relationship is based on certain expectations over a long 
period. Studying relationship over a prolonged duration may produce different 
results than the ones we report.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
The central objective of our research was to fill the gap in literature in regards to 
the impact of media and cultural differences on trust repair. Findings from our 
research fill this gap to a great extent. 
 
Our findings indicate that Collectivists tend to recover slightly better than 
Individualists following a trust breakdown.  However, the impact of culture on trust 
repair was weak at best and our findings refute previously established view that 
cultural differences play a significant role in how people show concerns for either 
self face or others’ face when it comes to trust repair. Why is that culture 
differences were so prominent in previous research and not so much in our 
research? One logical explanation could be the evolutionary and adaptive nature of 
culture. Over the years, increased use of media may have exposed people from one 
cultural background to another, resulting in a leveled playing ground. A leveled 
playground, in turn, may have resulted in a homogenous behavior patterns, at least, 
when it comes to business-like transactions such as the one studied in our research. 
Our findings provided support for a new trend in global behavior which is more 
alike than it used to be in the past. . It is possible that when it comes to 
electronically-mediated communications such as Internet transactions, culture does 
not matter. This is a significant contribution of this research.  Our findings, 
however, do not refute the existence of cultural difference because we did find 
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differences in participants’ perception of self for the two cultural groups through 
analysis of data in the background questionnaire. Cultural differences do exist.   
 
Media differences did not influence the extent to which participants recover from a 
trust breakdown contrary to our belief. The richness and social presence afforded 
by IM and AV for the task performed by participant in our study was about the 
same because we observed that participants in both media conditions were equally 
comfortable. Additionally, participants perception ratings in the two media 
conditions were not significantly different. The ratings further corroborate our 
findings on influence of media type on trust reparation. This finding challenges 
previously held notion about the appropriateness of a IM media for conflict 
situations such as trust repair and may need to investigated further. 
 
We were successful in simulating trust development and breach. We strongly 
believe that our methodology can be used for empirically studying trust repair. 
Trust games have been used in the past to study trust repair (e.g., Vasalou, 
Hopfensitz, & Pitt, 2008). In our research, we use a trust game to study trust repair 
in a slightly different way. We allowed our participants to rebuild their trust over 
10 rounds instead of forcing a one-shot response from them. There may be 
instances in the real world where a victim of trust violation may want to assess 
violator's post-violation strategy over a prolonged time period before re-
establishing trust back to pre-violation levels. The design of our trust game makes 
this possible by allowing 10 different opportunities (rounds 21-30) to the 
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participants to assess violator's strategy. Based on the gradual increase in offers by 
participants in the last 10 rounds of the game, we can conclude that victims of trust 
violation do not jump back to trusting their violator immediately but do so 
gradually. Research studies that employ trust games to measure trust repair may 
want to consider this fact and avoid using one-shot trust games but rather, give 
multiple opportunities to participants to recover from a trust violation. 
 
Another interesting finding from our research was the effect a brief conversation 
can have on participants’ propensity to trust.  After round 20 participants 
communicated very briefly with the confederate. Both cultural groups showed 
highly trusting behavior in the rounds following this conversation (rounds 21-30). 
During this conversation, the confederate was trained to accept responsibility for 
wrong doing. Subsequently, offers by participants reached an amount higher than 
those in the baseline set of rounds (rounds 1-10). This result underscores the 
importance of accepting responsibility for wrong doing and has applications in 
design of system where trust becomes a prerequisite. For example, Waters and 
Gasson (2006) make recommendations for enhancing participant engagement in 
online learning environments. Trust breakdown can negatively affect participant 
engagement as it plays a unifying role in such environments (Preece, 1999). Online 
learning environments, hence, should incorporate trust repair tools (e.g., allowing 
participants to provide explanations for wrong-doings or accepting blame, etc) so 
that participants can avail of themselves of these tools should a need arise.  
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Socio-psychology experiments aimed at understanding behavior tend to be based 
mostly in the U.S. and include participants born in the U.S. (Moghaddam, Taylor & 
Wright, 1993).  Our intent was to study cultural and media differences but we have 
uncovered universal behavior patterns.  We observed how accepting blame helps 
trust recovery in both cultural groups. We believe an experiment such as ours may 
be a step in the direction of discovering more “universals” or in other words 
universal principles that explain behaviors of individuals in different societies.  We 
hope our study will motivate fellow researchers to conduct studies that are larger in 
scope and size. 
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Appendix A 
Background Questionnaire 
Participant code: ____________   Date:___________ 
 
NOTE: Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.  In case 
of rating scales, please circle an appropriate number.  You may skip any question 
you do not wish to answer. You may contact the experimenter should you have any 
concerns regarding the questions. All data collected during this experiment is 
anonymous and confidential. Please do not write your name or any other 
information that will identify you as a respondent. 
 
1. What is your age: ______________ 
 
2. Nationality: ______________ 
 
3. Gender (circle one): M     F 
 
4. Are you familiar with instant messaging software such as Yahoo or MSN 
Messenger? YES  NO 
 
5. If you are not a U.S. national how long have you been in the U.S.? 
________ years 
 
6. I enjoy being unique and different from other in many ways 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
 
7. One should live one’s life independently of others 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
 
8. The well being of my co-workers is important to me 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
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9. Children should feel proud if their parents receive a distinguished award 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
 
10. Without competition it is not possible to have a good society 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
11. I hate to agree with others in my group 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
12. When I succeed it is usually because of my abilities 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
13. Competition is the law of nature 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
 
14. I like sharing little things with my neighbors 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
15. Ageing parents should live at home with their children 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
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16. What happens to me is my own doing 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
17. It is important to me that I perform better than others 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
18. I tend to do my own thing and most people in my family do the same 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
19. Suppose you had to use one word to describe yourself. Which of the 
following would it be (circle one)? 
a. unique 
b. competitive 
c. cooperative 
d. dutiful 
 
20. When dividing a bonus among different workers which of the following 
principle would you choose? 
a. Divide equally 
b. Divide based on performance 
c. Divide based on financial needs 
 
21. Which one of the following books appeals to you the most? 
a. How to make friends 
b. How to succeed in business 
c. How to enjoy yourself inexpensively 
d. How to build family ties 
 
22. When selecting an outfit for a major social event you would be most 
satisfied if 
a. You like it 
b. Your parents like it 
c. Your friends like it 
d. It is so elegant that it will impress everyone 
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23. You are considering joining a club. Which of the following factors would 
influence your decision in joining a club? 
a. The one where people have the most fun 
b. The one that is most prestigious 
c. Some of your family members and friends are already members of 
that club 
d. The one suggested by your parents 
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Appendix B 
 
Perception Questionnaire 
Participant code: ____________   Date: ___________ 
 
NOTE: We want to know if you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
Please circle an appropriate number based on your experience playing the game in 
the immediately preceding rounds. You may skip any question you do not wish to 
answer. You may contact the experimenter should you have any concerns 
regarding the questions. All data collected during this experiment is anonymous 
and confidential. Please do not write your name or any other information that will 
identify you as a respondent. 
 
1. I am very happy with how the results turned out 
  
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
2. I am very happy with how my opponent is cooperating in this game 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
 
3. You perceive your opponent as: 
 
 
Unfriendly 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Friendly 
 
 
Unpleasant 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Pleasant 
 
 
Untrustworthy 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Trustworthy 
 
 
Dishonest 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Honest 
 
 
Unreasonable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Reasonable 
 
 
Insincere 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Sincere 
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Firm 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Flexible 
 
Unreliable 1 2 3 4 5 6 Reliable 
 
 
4. Suppose you are the person responsible for making business decisions and your 
opponent (in this game) is your business competitor.  For your business to 
succeed it is very important for the both of you to cooperate and compete fairly. 
How likely are you to trust your opponent to cooperate in future business 
decisions? 
 
 
Unlikely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Very Likely 
 
  
5. What is the likelihood that you would continue a business relationship with your 
opponent? 
  
 
Unlikely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Very Likely 
 
 
6. Do you think your opponent was not being fair in the last 10 rounds of the game? 
If yes, what is the likelihood that you will forgive your opponent for not being 
fair? (Leave blank if you think your opponent was being fair) 
 
 
Unlikely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Very Likely 
 
 
7. In case you think your opponent was being unfair, how difficult would it be to 
rebuild your relationship with your opponent back to the point where it was before 
your opponent changed his/her strategy? (Leave blank if you think your opponent 
was being fair) 
 
 
Very 
Difficult 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Not Difficult 
At All 
 
 
8. Which of the following methods would you prefer for communicating with your 
opponent? 
a. Face-to-face 
b. Audio and video over the web (webcam) 
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c. Synchronous text (instant messaging) 
d. Asynchronous text (email) 
e. Phone 
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